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TAX REFORM DISCOURSE
Anthony C. Infanti∗
“Any measure that values a gun several hundred times more than a
bottle of milk is bound to raise serious questions about its relevance for
human progress. It is no surprise, then, that since the emergence of
national income accounts, there has been considerable dissatisfaction
with gross national product as a measure of human welfare. GNP
reflects market prices in monetary terms. Those prices quietly register
the prevailing economic and purchasing power in the system—but they
are silent about the distribution, character or quality of economic
growth. GNP also leaves out all activities that are not monetized—
household work, subsistence agriculture, unpaid services. And what is
more serious, GNP is one-dimensional: it fails to capture the cultural,
social, political and many other choices that people make.”
–Mahbub ul Haq
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I. INTRODUCTION
Tax reform equals economic growth. This simple equation
captures both the essence of, and the essential problem with, recent
2
debates over tax reform. As the Organisation for Economic Co-

2

My primary focus in this article is on U.S. domestic tax reform debates, even
though the obsession with pro-growth tax reform is by no means a uniquely American
phenomenon. See infra Part II.B. For an interesting discussion of the troubling aspects
of the tax reform discourse regarding so-called developing or transition countries, see
Miranda Stewart, Global Trajectories of Tax Reform: The Discourse of Tax Reform in
Developing and Transition Countries, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139 (2003).
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operation and Development (OECD) has succinctly stated, “[t]ax
3
systems are primarily aimed at financing public expenditures.” Or, in
the words of President Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax
Reform, “[T]he interests of a few should not stand in the way of the
tax code’s primary goal: to raise funds efficiently for the common
4
defense, vital social programs, and other goals of shared purpose.”
Yet, debates over reforming our tax system tend to focus not on the
public good — that is, on advancing human development — but
narrowly on facilitating economic growth. In this article, I propose
shifting the tax reform discourse away from a nearly unwavering focus
on economic growth toward a broader focus on people, and, more
5
particularly, on those in our society who are disadvantaged.
Economic growth can be important to human development, but it
6
is far from all that there is to development. Indeed, economists
Anthony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez have shown
how recent periods of economic growth have redounded primarily to
the benefit of the privileged few at the top of the income scale. In a
comparative study using income tax data, they have shown that the
share of income going to the top ten percent of the population in the
United States experienced a precipitous decline during World War II,
leveled off in the postwar decades, and significantly spiked beginning
7
in the 1970s. The share of total income going to the top ten percent
reached nearly fifty percent by 2007, which is “the highest level on
3

Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Tax Policy Reform and
Economic Growth, OECD Tax Policy Studies No. 20, at 18 (2010); see, e.g., Alice G.
Abreu & Richard K. Greenstein, Defining Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 295, 334 (2011)
(“[T]he tax system exists to raise revenue.”).
4
Letter from the President’s Advisory Panel on Fed. Tax Reform to John W.
Snow, Sec’y of the Treasury (Nov. 1, 2005), in PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED.
TAX REFORM, SIMPLE, FAIR, AND PRO-GROWTH: PROPOSALS TO FIX AMERICA’S TAX
SYSTEM 7, 9 (2005).
5
I use the term “disadvantaged” here in a broad sense. It is meant to capture
the disadvantage experienced by traditionally subordinated groups, including women,
racial and ethnic minorities, sexual minorities, the poor, and those with physical
disabilities. It is also meant to capture other groups — for example, undocumented
immigrants and those in rural communities — who experience comparative
disadvantage in terms of their sharing in the overall human development that we
experience as a society.
6
U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2010: THE REAL
WEALTH OF NATIONS: PATHWAYS TO HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 5 (2010) [hereinafter
2010 HDR] (“[H]uman development is different from economic growth and . . .
substantial achievements are possible even without fast growth.”).
7
Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Top Incomes in the
Long Run of History, 49 J. ECON. LITERATURE 3, 6 (2011).
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8

record.” Most of this change benefited the top one percent, which
saw its share of income increase “from 8.9 percent in 1976 to 23.5
9
percent in 2007.” The top 0.1% has done even better, with its share of
income having “more than quadrupled from 2.6 percent to 12.3
10
percent over this period.” As a result, “the top 1 percent captured 58
11
percent of real economic growth” during this period.
The picture becomes even more striking when one focuses on
Saez and Piketty’s work regarding the two most recent periods of
economic growth (i.e., 1993–2000 and 2002–2007). During the period
from 1993–2008, the “top 1 percent incomes captured slightly more
12
than half of the overall economic growth.” During the period from
2002–2007, “the top 1 percent captured two thirds of income
13
growth.” As expected, the top one percent saw its share of income
14
drop during the recession — from 23% in 2007 to 17% in 2009.
Importantly, however, according to Saez:
[T]he Great Recession is unlikely to have a very large impact
on top income shares and will certainly not undo much of the
dramatic increase in top income shares that has taken place
since the 1970s. . . . [B]ased on the US historical record, falls
in income concentration due to economic downturns are
temporary unless drastic regulation and tax policy changes
are implemented and prevent income concentration from
15
bouncing back.
In fact, in 2010, the top one percent saw its share of income “gr[o]w by
8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 8.
12
Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the
United States (Updated with 2008 Estimates), ECONOMETRICS LABORATORY
SOFTWARE ARCHIVE AT U.C. BERKELEY, at 3 (July 17, 2010), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/
~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2008.pdf. In this article, Saez builds upon and updates
earlier work he did with Thomas Piketty. See Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez,
Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998, 118 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2003).
13
Saez, supra note 12, at 3.
14
Jason DeParle, Top Earners Not So Lofty in the Days of Recession, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2011, at B1; see also Emmanuel Saez, Striking It Richer: The
Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States (Updated with 2009 and 2010
Estimates), ECONOMETRICS LABORATORY SOFTWARE ARCHIVE AT U.C. BERKELEY,
at 1 (March 2, 2012), http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2010.pdf
(reporting a decline in the top percentile’s share of income from 23.5% to 18.1%).
15
Saez, supra note 12, at 1.
9
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11.6% while bottom 99% incomes grew only by 0.2%.” In other
words, “the top 1% captured 93% of the income gains in the first year
17
of recovery.”
The Congressional Budget Office reached similar conclusions in a
18
study of the distribution of household income from 1979 to 2007.
Additionally, in the context of a broader study of inequality across its
19
member countries, the OECD observed that “[t]he United States is
the country with the highest inequality level and poverty rate across
20
the OECD, Mexico and Turkey excepted.” The OECD further
noted that, in the United States, “[t]he average income of the richest
10% is . . . in purchasing power parities, the highest level in the
OECD. However, the poorest 10% of the US citizens have an
21
income . . . about 20% lower than the average for OECD countries.”
As Saez has asserted, the results of such studies “may help explain
the disconnect between the economic experiences of the public and
the solid macroeconomic growth posted by the U.S. economy from
22
2002 to 2007” as well as “the recent public demonstrations against

16

Saez, supra note 14, at 1; see also DeParle, supra note 14.
Saez, supra note 14, at 1.
18
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PUB. NO. 4031, TRENDS IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF
HOUSEHOLD INCOME BETWEEN 1979 AND 2007, at 5 (2011) (mentioning Piketty &
Saez, supra note 12). For a summary of this study’s findings, see infra text
accompanying notes 85–88.
19
OECD, Growing Unequal? Income Distribution and Poverty in OECD
Countries (2008).
20
OECD, Country Note: United States (2008), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
47/2/41528678.pdf.
21
Id. (emphasis omitted).
22
Saez, supra note 12, at 3. Atkinson, Saez, and Piketty put this in perspective
by comparing the growth in U.S. income over this time period with the growth in
income in France over the same period:
17

[A]verage real incomes per family in the United States grew by 32.2 percent
from 1975 to 2006 while they grew only by 27.1 percent in France during the
same period . . . showing that the macroeconomic performance in the
United States was better than the French one during this period. Excluding
the top percentile, average U.S. real incomes grew only 17.9 percent during
the period while average French real incomes—excluding the top
percentile—still grew at much the same rate (26.4 percent) as for the whole
French population. Therefore, the better macroeconomic performance of
the United States versus France is reversed when excluding the top 1
percent.
Atkinson, Piketty & Saez, supra note 7, at 9 (citation and footnote omitted).
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23

inequality.” The results of these studies have also set off alarm bells
in some quarters, leading to calls for reform that encourages “broad24
based” economic growth. But achieving broad-based economic
growth is no panacea because human development is about much
25
more than just increasing incomes and economic growth. Put
differently, even under the best of conditions, economic growth is an
impoverished proxy for human development. Under current
conditions, its value as a proxy for human development has been
completely spent. The time has come to shift the focus of tax reform
debates toward advancing human development — with a special focus
on aiding those who are disadvantaged in our society — and away
from further entrenching the privilege of a wealthy few.
The remainder of this article is divided into four parts. Part II
illustrates how tax reform debates in the United States (and abroad)
have come to revolve around spurring economic growth. Part III then
draws on the development literature to show how there is far more to
human development than just economic growth. By tracing the
journey in this literature away from an unbending focus on economic
growth toward broader notions (and measures) of human
development, Part III directly undermines the equation of tax reform
with efforts to stimulate economic growth. Having broken the link
between tax reform and economic growth, Part IV then turns to
considering how the tax reform debate might change if the unbending
focus on economic growth were replaced with a broader focus on
advancing human development. In particular, and keeping in mind the

23

Saez, supra note 14, at 1.
ROGER C. ALTMAN, MICHAEL GREENSTONE, ROBERT E. RUBIN & SARAH
CANNON, BROOKINGS INST., FROM RECESSION TO RECOVERY TO RENEWAL: AN
ECONOMIC STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE BROADLY SHARED GROWTH (2010), available at
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/4/economic%20recovery%20
greenstone/04_economic_recovery_greenstone.pdf; see Richard V. Burkhauser, Jeff
Larrimore & Kosali I. Simon, A “Second Opinion” on the Economic Health of the
American Middle Class, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 7, 8 (2012) (in the context of calling the
approach of Piketty and Saez’s research into question, discussing how the narrow
sharing of economic growth has gained the attention of the popular press and led to
calls for more broad-based sharing of economic growth); see also Floyd Norris, As
Corporate Profits Rise, Workers’ Income Declines, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2011, at B3
(indicating that “corporate profits accounted for 14 percent of the total national
income in 2010, the highest proportion ever recorded,” while, in that same year,
employees received less than half of total national income for the first time, which
“may help explain the economic worries of many Americans who have jobs but still
fear they are falling behind.”).
25
See infra Part III.
24
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lessons learned from the development literature, Part IV considers the
impact of such a shift on the debate about eliminating tax
expenditures — that is, the tax “loopholes” that always seem to be in
the crosshairs of tax reformers. Part V provides brief concluding
remarks.
II. THE MANTRA OF ECONOMIC GROWTH
In the introduction to their book Fundamental Tax Reform, John
Diamond and George Zodrow observe:
The current tax reform discussion in the United States and
around the world differs to some extent from earlier debates
on tax reform, in that much of the current interest in changing
the tax structure focuses on improving the tax climate for
business in order to stimulate additional saving, investment,
26
employment, wages, and economic growth.
A few examples will help to underscore Diamond and Zodrow’s
point. To this end, the first section of this Part includes several recent
examples from the United States that illustrate how economic growth
has become the buzzword of our tax reform debates. The second
section of this Part provides a few brief examples illustrating how the
idea that tax reform should be used to stimulate economic growth has
spread beyond the United States, especially in the wake of the global
financial and economic crisis.
A. The American Experience
In 2005, President George W. Bush’s Advisory Panel on Federal
Tax Reform issued its report. Three principles typically guide any tax
policy inquiry: (1) efficiency, (2) equity, and (3) administrability. In
other words, when formulating tax policy, we usually “strive for a tax
system that (1) minimizes interference with economic decisionmaking
27
[sic], (2) is fair, and (3) is easy to administer and comply with.”
28
Echoing the executive order establishing the panel, the title of the
panel’s report — Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix
America’s Tax System — repeats these three principles, but with one
26

John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow, Introduction: Is It Time for
Fundamental Tax Reform?, in FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND
IMPLICATIONS 2, 3 (2008).
27
Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1192 (2008).
28
Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (2005).
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significant modification. Rather than striving for a tax system that
refrains from tinkering with economic decision making to the greatest
extent possible, the panel (and President Bush) saw its purpose as
tilting the economic playing field to encourage “growth.” In fact, one
of the two reform proposals put forward by the panel was labeled the
29
“Growth and Investment Tax Plan.” After all, as the panel
30
counterfactually contended, “[g]reater economic growth should . . .
31
benefit all Americans.”
For instance, the panel made a number of recommendations that
were intended to create strong incentives for taxpayers to save or
32
make investments, rather than to consume now.
It also
recommended that small businesses be permitted to immediately
expense most asset purchases in order to “encourage new investment
33
and capital formation by growing businesses.” Such generous
expensing (e.g., the “bonus” depreciation provision in § 168(k)) has
been criticized in the past for encouraging investment in capital at the
expense of investment in labor (i.e., hiring), leading to jobless
34
economic recoveries following economic downturns. Perhaps more
astonishingly, the panel made this recommendation despite its own
deprecation of the inefficiencies created by our extant depreciation
system, which favors investments in certain types of assets over
35
others. Thus, far from removing the tax “thumb” from the scales,
these examples illustrate tax reform proposals that either move the
tax “thumb” from one side of the scales to the other or place an even
heavier weight on one side over the other.
Similarly, a few years later, Professor Michael Graetz put forward
36
his own tax reform plan. As the centerpiece of his plan, Professor
29

PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 4, at 59. The
other was the “Simplified Income Tax Plan.” Id.
30
See supra text accompanying notes 12–24.
31
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 4, at 138;
see also id. at 178 (“Greater economic growth, which is projected to occur under the
Growth and Investment Tax Plan, would also generally benefit all Americans by
increasing their incomes.”).
32
Id. at 89–93.
33
Id. at 95.
34
Theodore P. Seto, The Problem with Bonus Depreciation, 126 TAX NOTES 782,
782 (Feb. 8, 2010). For a more general critique of accelerated depreciation that
questions its relationship to economic growth, see Yoram Margalioth, Not a Panacea
for Economic Growth: The Case of Accelerated Depreciation, 26 VA. TAX REV. 493
(2007).
35
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 4, at 95–98.
36
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, 100 MILLION UNNECESSARY RETURNS: A SIMPLE, FAIR,
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Graetz suggested scaling back the income tax, so that it applies only to
those with higher incomes, and enacting a value-added tax to make up
37
for the loss in revenue. In the third paragraph of his book making the
case for this proposal, Professor Graetz wrote the following
illuminating passage:
The time for fundamental reform has come. In a world
immeasurably more interdependent than the world of the
mid-twentieth century, when our current system of taxation
took shape, a vital question for any reform proposal is: Will it
make American workers and businesses more competitive in
the global economy, while maintaining the progressive
structure consistent with our nation’s historical insistence on
fairness? The proposal I offer in this book—what I will call
38
the Competitive Tax—does just that.
Despite acknowledging the importance of a “progressive structure” to
39
our tax system, Professor Graetz’s primary focus is on enhancing
competitiveness. This is clear both from his phrasing of the “vital
question” and from the fact that he denominates his plan the
“Competitive Tax” rather than the “Competitive and Fair Tax” or the
“Fair and Competitive Tax” or even the “Fair Competitive Tax.”
When he later opens his discussion of “[f]irst [p]rinciples of
40
[r]esponsible [r]eform,” Professor Graetz describes the “traditional
goals of tax reform” as follows: “produce adequate revenue; promote
economic growth; increase international competitiveness of U.S.
products, workers, and businesses; minimize interference with private

AND COMPETITIVE TAX PLAN FOR THE UNITED STATES

(2008).
For a summary of Professor Graetz’s plan, see id. at 197–213.
38
Id. at 4; see also id. at 16 (“We need a tax system that will encourage
investment in the United States to create good jobs and will help make the goods and
services our businesses and workers produce more affordable to consumers around
the world.”).
39
To achieve a “progressive structure” in his Competitive Tax, Professor Graetz
retains the income tax on higher-income earners and proposes either a “payroll
adjustment” targeted at lower-income earners or the distribution of “‘smart’ cards
that would be scanned by retailers to eliminate VAT on either a specified amount of
purchases or on purchases of specific goods and services.” Id. at 170–71, 178; see id. at
170–81 (explaining both possibilities).
Professor Graetz’s choice of words here is quite intriguing because there is a
difference between a tax system with a “progressive structure” and a tax system that
actually operates in a progressive fashion. Infanti, supra note 27, at 1251–52.
40
GRAETZ, supra note 36, at 52.
37
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decision making; streamline compliance and administration; and,
finally, distribute the burden of taxation fairly in accordance with
41
people’s ability to pay.” In this litany of principles, setting aside the
obvious goal of producing revenue, Professor Graetz first mentions
economic growth and next increasing competitiveness. He only then
reiterates the three principles that typically guide tax policy inquiries,
mentioning the efficiency or neutrality of the tax system first,
simplification second, and fairness last of all. Again, the primary focus
is on economic growth.
More recently, the topic of tax reform has surfaced in connection
with discussions of deficit reduction. The need for tax reform to
increase or enhance the nation’s economic growth often surfaces in
these discussions. For example, Erskine Bowles and Alan Simpson,
co-chairmen of the National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and
Reform, penned an op-ed piece in The New York Times on the
summer 2011 deal to increase the debt ceiling, in which they stated:
And we must address the tax code. We need new revenue to
finance the increasing costs of our health care system and an
aging population — but it should come from reducing or
eliminating tax breaks, not from higher rates. The tax code is
riddled with annual tax breaks amounting to $1 trillion —
most of which are just government spending in disguise. By
reforming them, we can reduce individual and corporate tax
rates in a way that keeps the tax code progressive while
promoting economic growth and reducing the deficit at the
42
same time.
In an op-ed piece published in The Wall Street Journal in the wake of
the debt-ceiling debate, Kevin Warsh, a former Governor of the
Federal Reserve, and Jeb Bush, former Governor of Florida,
suggested that the nation’s “economic grand strategy” should be, “[i]n
43
a word: growth.” They explained that:
An effective growth strategy confronts tough challenges
before they become intractable. The strategy is a threat to
those who take refuge in our burdensome tax code, and it is a

41

Id.
Erskine B. Bowles & Alan K. Simpson, Op-Ed., A Crisis Merely Postponed,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2011, at A25.
43
Kevin Warsh & Jeb Bush, Op-Ed., A New Strategy for Economic Growth,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2011, at A15.
42
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great source of encouragement to those who seek higher rates
of return on physical and human capital. Hence, fundamental
tax reform—dramatically lowering tax rates for individuals
and companies while eliminating loopholes, deductions and
44
credits—is critical to economic growth.
In an op-ed piece published in The Washington Post to explain and
“sell” the agreement reached to end the showdown over raising the
debt ceiling, Timothy Geithner, the Secretary of the Treasury, wrote
that “[t]he agreement sets up a powerful mechanism for agreement on
45
tax reforms to strengthen growth.” Similarly, Pennsylvania Senator
Pat Toomey, one of the members of the congressional “super
committee” created as part of this agreement, reportedly stated that
“his ‘guiding principles’ on the committee will be ‘the twin goals of
reducing the deficit and continuing to promote economic growth.’ To
that end, he hopes to reform the tax code in order to broaden the base
46
while lowering rates and growing the economy.” Moreover, John
Boehner, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, urged the
super committee to tackle tax reform in an effort to “improve the
47
environment for economic growth.” Similarly, a group of thirty-six
senators (including all but one member of the so-called Gang of Six)
called on the super committee to “‘focus on the major parts of the
budget and include long-term entitlement reforms and pro-growth tax
48
reform.’”
B. International Experience
This focus on tax reform as a potential driver of economic growth
is by no means a uniquely American phenomenon, especially with the
advent of the global financial and economic crisis. For instance, in
2010, the OECD issued a report aptly titled Tax Policy Reform and
49
Economic Growth. In this report, the OECD investigated what it
described as a “key issue for tax policy making”; namely, “how tax
44

Id.
Timothy Geithner, Op-Ed., Compromise Achieved, Reform’s The Next
Chapter, WASH. POST, Aug. 2, 2011, at A15.
46
Andrew Stiles, Toomey Outlines Goals for Debt Committee, NATIONAL
REVIEW ONLINE (Aug. 10, 2011, 3:16 PM), http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/
274254/toomey-outlines-goals-debt-committee-andrew-stiles#.
47
Michael M. Gleeson & Drew Pierson, Boehner Pushes Supercommittee to
Take on Tax Reform, 132 TAX NOTES 1204, 1204 (Sept. 19, 2011).
48
Id. (quoting from a release issued by Sen. Daniel Coats).
49
OECD, supra note 3.
45
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structures could best be designed to promote economic growth.”
Notwithstanding an acknowledgment that tax systems are used to
achieve objectives other than economic growth, the OECD generally
ignored these other objectives in preparing its report, “except when
there is a clear trade off between them and tax reforms aimed at
51
raising GDP per capita.” In explaining its focus on economic growth,
the OECD stated that, even though “there is not necessarily a direct
link between economic growth and overall well-being,” economic
growth “should increase the level of public expenditure that can be
regarded as ‘affordable’ and make it easier to keep public debt within
52
sustainable bounds.”
In its report, the OECD considered “four broad groups of taxes
— consumption, property, personal income and corporate/capital
53
income taxes.” Of these four groups, the OECD concluded that
taxes on corporate and capital income are the most damaging to
54
economic growth, followed by personal income taxes. A pro-growth
tax reform would, according to the OECD, involve “shifting the
balance of taxation away from income taxes and towards a mixture of
consumption taxes and taxes on immovable property, particularly on
55
residential property.” Such a tax reform would be even “more
effective in increasing growth if the design of the VAT were improved
at the same time — by removing exemptions, zero-rating and reduced
56
rates.” Similarly, to the extent that income taxes are retained in the
reform, the OECD advocated in favor of broadening the income tax
57
base and lowering the rates, particularly the top rates.
The OECD examined tax reform trends in its member countries
to determine the extent to which they followed its “‘tax and growth’
58
recommendations.” It concluded that many OECD member states
had “cut personal and corporate tax rates while broadening the tax
base” and that there was a trend toward “increased use of value50

Id. at 18.
Id. The OECD did this for the sake of confining itself to a “manageable” task
and because the OECD had earlier produced studies covering other objectives (e.g.,
equity and environmental matters). Id.
52
Id. at 9.
53
Id. at 40.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.; see also id. at 20–23 (discussing the points made in this paragraph in
detail).
58
Id. at 21 box 1.2.
51
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added taxes,” though there was “a general trend to higher VAT
59
rates.” With these trends in mind, the OECD then spent the
following chapters identifying the obstacles to tax reform and
providing recommendations on how to surmount them in order to
60
implement pro-growth tax reforms.
Similarly, the European Commission issued a report in October
2011 outlining tax reforms in European Union member states that, for
the first time, bore the subtitle “Tax Policy Challenges for Economic
61
Growth and Fiscal Sustainability.” After surveying the tax reform
trends in European Union member states since the onset of the global
62
financial and economic crisis, the European Commission discussed
what it called the “quality of taxation” with a “focus on the effects of
taxation on GDP and on long-term and sustainable economic growth.
This reflects the key priority for Europe of achieving smart,
63
sustainable and inclusive growth.” The European Commission then
screened member states to determine which could benefit from
64
“improving the structure of taxation to enhance economic growth.”
In keeping with its focus on “smart, sustainable, and inclusive
growth,” the European Commission made recommendations for
relieving the tax burden on labor — particularly the tax burden on
low-skilled workers and secondary earners (who are primarily
women) — and shifting toward a greater reliance on taxes on property
and consumption (especially where the level of these taxes is
65
relatively low). Having earlier dismissed concerns about the
regressivity of these taxes, the European Commission advocated this
shift because property and consumption taxes “are the least
66
detrimental to growth.”
Outside of the OECD and the European Union, in late 2011,
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin added his voice to the international
chorus linking tax reform with economic growth when he stated that

59

Id. at 26; see also id. at 40–43 (providing greater detail in summarizing these
trends).
60
Id. at 48–80.
61
Tax Reforms in EU Member States 2011: Tax Policy Challenges for Economic
Growth and Fiscal Sustainability, EUR. COMM’N, 9, 13 (May 2011),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2011/pdf/ee2011-5_en.pdf.
62
Id. at 31–46.
63
Id. at 47.
64
Id. at 86.
65
Id.; see generally id. at 86–98.
66
Id. at 86; see id. at 60–62.
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Russia “needs a resolute tax maneuver. It needs a modern structure of
the tax system; we have to think about optimizing the taxes which are
67
crucial for quality economic growth.” Economic growth is on the
minds of tax reformers not only in the United States but also around
the world.
III. TAX REFORM ≠ ECONOMIC GROWTH
As mentioned in the introduction to this article, the general aim
68
of tax systems is to finance public expenditures. Put differently,
“[t]ax law is a basic institution that shapes society and must serve the
69
public good.” Yet, our tax reform discourse does not focus directly
on how reform can be used as a vehicle for advancing the public good.
Instead, calling to mind a phrase often attributed to John F. Kennedy
70
— “A rising tide raises all the boats” — tax reform discourse in the
United States has come to focus on advancing economic growth as a
proxy or indirect route for advancing the public good. But, as the
studies cited in the introduction to this article highlight, advancing
economic growth is not necessarily and ineluctably an end that serves
the good of the public. In fact, in recent decades, a very small (and
wealthy) slice of the population has reaped the lion’s share of the
rewards of economic growth, which makes the goal of advancing
economic growth appear to be one that primarily serves the private
good of an already privileged few.
This Part draws on the development literature to break the
connection between tax reform and economic growth. The first
section briefly explores why: (1) under the best of conditions,
economic growth is a poor proxy for human development; and (2)
under current conditions, it is a highly misleading proxy for human
development. The next section describes the journey of important
contributors to the development literature away from a narrow focus
on economic growth and per capita income toward a broader view

67

Putin Promises “Tax Maneuver,” ITAR-TASS (Dec. 21, 2011, 5:22 PM),
http://www.itar-tass.com/en/c32/303232.html.
68
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
69
Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325,
361 (1997) (emphasis added); see also Edward J. McCaffery, A New Understanding of
Tax, 103 MICH. L. REV. 807, 829–30 (2005) (“On reflection, the principal end of
broad-based, comprehensive tax systems is to finance the provision of public goods,
the central activity of the modern democratic state. . . .”).
70
THE YALE BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 422 (Fred R. Shapiro ed., 2006).
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(and the creation of broader measures) of human development. It
then turns to describing what this broader view of human
development looks like as well as some of the metrics that have been
developed to measure it. This Part closes with a description of the
lessons that those who participate in tax reform debates can learn
from the journey in the development literature away from a singular
focus on economic growth and toward a broader view of human
development.
A. Economic Growth as a Poor Proxy for Development
Even when the rising tide is raising all the boats, economic growth
falls short as a proxy for human development. For example, the
economist and philosopher Amartya Sen has persuasively argued that:
An adequate conception of development must go much
beyond the accumulation of wealth and the growth of gross
national product and other income-related variables. Without
ignoring the importance of economic growth, we must look
well beyond it.
The ends and means of development require examination and
scrutiny for a fuller understanding of the development
process; it is simply not adequate to take as our basic
objective just the maximization of income or wealth, which is,
as Aristotle noted, “merely useful and for the sake of
something else.” For the same reason, economic growth
71
cannot sensibly be treated as an end in itself.
Economist Sabina Alkire has further enumerated the shortcomings of
economic growth as a measure of human development:
Yet dissatisfaction with GDP and economic growth rates as
adequate metrics of well-being is rising for several reasons.
First, although GDP is useful for many purposes, it does not
reflect equity nor the composition of growth. Second, some
high GDP growth strategies have created financial
instabilities and crises. Third, GDP does not reflect the
burden on the earth’s resources. Fourth, people often value
achievements that do not show up immediately or at all in
high income and growth figures: health; knowledge;
71

AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT
131, 290–92.

AS

FREEDOM 14 (1999); see id. at 3, 8–9, 90,
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livelihoods; relationships; safety; art and culture; happiness,
self-direction; and political freedoms. Naturally people want
good incomes and work hard to obtain them. But income is
72
not the sum total of human life.
And economists Gustav Ranis, Frances Stewart, and Yili Dong have
concluded, based on a group of country studies, that countries cannot
move into a virtuous cycle where human development and economic
growth are mutually supporting and reinforcing “by according sole
73
priority to [economic growth].” Instead, to enter a virtuous cycle,
74
countries have to place priority on human development.
But what is, in the best of conditions, a partial and imperfect
proxy for human development now provides nothing less than a highly
misleading and distorted picture of human development in the United
States. The distortion stems from the fact that, as demonstrated by the
75
economic work discussed in the introduction to this article, the rising
76
tide has “swamped the majority of people” while raising only the
77
yachts of the wealthiest and most privileged. It has become nearly
impossible to open the newspaper each morning, whether physically
or virtually, without seeing a story that reinforces this feeling. To list
but a few examples of stories appearing in newspapers around the
country:


An Economic Policy Institute study of census data revealed
that incomes have declined significantly more in the two
years following the end of the 2007–2009 recession (by
6.7%) than they did during the recession itself (by 3.2%),

72

United Nations Dev. Programme [UNDP], Human Development: Definitions,
Critiques, and Related Concepts, at 38, Research Paper 2010/01 (June 2010),
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/papers/HDRP_2010_01.pdf (by Sabina
Alkire); see HAQ, supra note 1, at 14–15 (similarly describing why economic growth
does not necessarily expand people’s other choices).
73
Gustav Ranis, Frances Stewart & Yili Dong, Successful Transition Towards a
Virtuous Cycle of Human Development and Economic Growth: Country Studies, in
PIONEERING THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REVOLUTION: AN INTELLECTUAL
BIOGRAPHY OF MAHBUB UL HAQ 171, 216 (Khadija Haq & Richard Ponzio eds.,
2008); see HAQ, supra note 1, at 40–41 (providing examples of countries with identical
per capita GNP but radically different levels of human development).
74
Ranis, Stewart & Dong, supra note 73, at 216.
75
See supra Part I.
76
Liz Hrenda, Letter to the Editor, Most Are Swamped, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Sept. 23, 2011, at B6.
77
See supra notes 12–24 and accompanying text.
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with greater declines experienced by (1) African
Americans and Latino/as than by whites and (2) those who
78
already had lower incomes.


A Census Bureau report indicated that nearly one in six
Americans lived in poverty in 2010, with disproportionate
79
effects felt by African Americans, Latino/as, and women.
Reinforcing the feeling of growing income inequality, the
Census Bureau report further noted that median household
income has declined by 7.1% since 1999, but that the
decline for the bottom ten percent was a much higher
12.1% in contrast to a much smaller decline of 1.5% for the
top ten percent and an increase in income for the top one
80
percent.



A Pew Research Center report analyzing census data found
that the wealth gap between whites, on the one hand, and
th
African Americans (with 1/20 the wealth of whites) and
th
Latino/as (with 1/18 of the wealth of whites), on the other,
was wider at the end of the 2007–2009 recession than it had
been at any time since the Census Bureau began collecting
81
this data. And, “[i]n every ethnic group, the Pew
82
researchers found, the poorest fared worst.”



An Economic Policy Institute snapshot showed that from
1983–2009 nearly 82% of the gains in wealth went to the
wealthiest five percent of households (with nearly half of
that amount going to the top one percent while the other
half was split by the top four percent); in contrast, the
bottom sixty percent of households experienced a 7.5%
83
decline in wealth. Or, put differently, “[t]he bottom 60
percent of households actually had less wealth in 2009 than

78

Robert Pear, Median Incomes Shrank Further After Recession, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 10, 2011, at A1.
79
Michael A. Fletcher, Census Shows Impact of Recession, WASH. POST, Sept.
14, 2011, at A1.
80
Id.
81
Kate Santich, Study: Black, Hispanic Wealth Takes Bigger Hit, CHI. TRIB., July
27, 2011, at C17.
82
Id.
83
Robert Frank, The Wealthiest 5% Grabbed Most of the America’s Gains,
WALL ST. J. BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2011, 12:24 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/wealth/2011/09/16/
the-top-5-grabbed-most-of-the-americas-gains/.
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in 1983, meaning they did not participate at all in the
84
growth of wealth over this period.”


A Congressional Budget Office report found that, from
1979 through 2007, “[t]he top 1 percent of earners more
than doubled their share of the nation’s income” and
“government policy [is] . . . doing less to reduce the
85
concentration of income.” In particular, the report noted
that federal tax policy has had a smaller equalizing effect,
given a shift during that time period away from income
86
taxes and toward payroll taxes. During those three
decades, the top one percent saw their “average inflation87
adjusted after-tax income [grow] by 275 percent.” In
contrast, the poorest twenty percent of the population saw
88
their income grow by only 18% during that period.

Instead of using such a deeply flawed proxy, the time has come to
focus on advancing human development more directly. The
development literature has already undergone a similar
transformation, with important contributors moving away from an
unbending focus on economic growth and toward a more holistic view
89
of development. For instance, Amartya Sen regards “identifying
development with the growth of gross national product, or with the
rise in personal incomes” as examples of “narrower views of
90
development.” And Mahbub ul Haq has observed:
[A]fter many decades of development, we are rediscovering
the obvious — that people are both the means and the end of
economic development. Often, this simple truth gets obscured
because we are used to talking in abstractions, in aggregates,
in numbers. Human beings, fortunately too stubborn to lend
84

Lawrence Mishel, Huge Disparity in Share of Total Wealth Gain Since 1983,
ECON. POL’Y INST. (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.epi.org/publication/large-disparityshare-total-wealth-gain/.
85
Robert Pear, It’s Official: The Rich Get Richer, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011, at
A20.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Anthony C. Infanti, Internation Equity and Human Development, in TAX LAW
AND DEVELOPMENT (Yariv Brauner & Miranda Stewart, eds., forthcoming Feb.
2013). The discussion in this Part draws from, and expands upon, this earlier work.
90
SEN, supra note 71, at 3.
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themselves to becoming a mere abstraction, are conveniently
91
forgotten.
Other participants in debates over development policy have similarly
92
expanded their horizons beyond economic growth. The next section
briefly traces this journey toward a more expansive view of human
development.
B. Emergence of the Idea of Human Development
Although “[m]eeting . . . basic human needs became the dominant
development priority” in the 1970s, this “strategy was killed off within
93
five years” due to “a return to economic orthodoxy” in the 1980s.
During the 1980s and 1990s, in response to the debt crisis, “[s]tructural
adjustment dominated economic policymaking in Latin America and
94
95
Africa,” leading to a rise in poverty. Alongside this “ideological
shift in favour of the role of markets in economic management, there
was an important evolution in development thinking — focusing on
people-centred approaches. The work of the human development
96
approach contributed significantly to this trend.” Then, in 1990, a
team working under the auspices of the United Nations Development
97
Program (UNDP), with Amartya Sen as an adviser, issued the first

91

HAQ, supra note 1, at 3.
Though certainly not all of them. RICHARD JOLLY, LOUIS EMMERIJ & THOMAS
G. WEISS, UN IDEAS THAT CHANGED THE WORLD 193 (2009) (“Many still argue that
economic growth will bring the other things necessary for people to live the good life.
The appeal of ‘trickle-down’ — like neoclassical economics — is not just the analytical
strength of the economic theory, which was developed in some of the best universities
of the world, but also the way that its priorities match the economic and political
interests and economic ideology of the major powers and more developed
countries.”); see Desmond McNeill, “Human Development”: The Power of the Idea, 8
J. HUM. DEV. 5, 13 (2007) (“[T]he concept human development, being more explicitly
opposed to another — arguably the dominant — perspective, is less susceptible to
distortion.”).
93
JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at 187; see id. at 193 (further
explaining this point).
94
Id. at 187; see id. at 193 (further explaining this point).
95
Richard Ponzio, The Advent of the Human Development Report, in
PIONEERING THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 73, at 88, 90.
96
Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, The Intellectual Journey Continues: Today’s Global
Agenda and the New Frontiers of Human Development, in PIONEERING THE HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REVOLUTION, supra note 73, at 223, 246–47; see HAQ, supra note 1, at
24–25; Ranis, Stewart & Dong, supra note 73, at 171–72.
97
JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at 188; see Fukuda-Parr, supra note
92

INFANTI.FINAL.DOC

224

10/23/2012 6:03 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. XXXII:205

Human Development Report (HDR) “partly in response to this
98
inhospitable environment.”
[T]he first annual Human Development Report . . . promoted
a comprehensive vision and an alternative to neoliberal
analysis and policy. The reports of the series brought the
concept of human development to worldwide attention and
gave it economic breadth and philosophical depth. They also
attracted exceptional media attention in both developed and
developing countries. In addition to presenting a new
paradigm for economic and social development, successive
reports expounded the approach in relation to key areas:

96, at 226 (describing Amartya Sen as a “long standing friend” of Mahbub ul Haq
who “played a key role in developing the HDRs and in defining the concept and
measurement of human development”; Sen is also described as playing an important
role in three HDRs that “expanded the conceptual foundations of the human
development approach” in the early 2000s by focusing on human rights, cultural
liberty, and democracy).
The HDRs typically contain a caveat that they do not necessarily reflect the
views of the UNDP but only those of the team that produced them. Yet, “[t]he
independence and integrity of its authors has indeed been the strength of the HDR.”
McNeill, supra note 92, at 11–12. In fact, when describing the history leading up to the
first HDRs, Richard Ponzio states:
To serve the interests of the global community, [Mahbub ul Haq] felt that
the report would need to promote a candid, uninhibited policy dialogue on
the state of people’s well-being instead of only on the state of national
economies. Consequently, Haq sought and successfully secured from
Draper [the UNDP administrator] complete intellectual freedom and
editorial independence.
Ponzio, supra note 95, at 89. For example, the 1990 HDR contains the following
caveat in its foreword: “The views expressed in this Report are those of the team and
not necessarily shared by UNDP or its Governing Council or the member
governments of UNDP. The essence of any such report must be its independence and
its intellectual integrity.” William H. Draper III, Foreword to U.N. DEV. PROGRAM,
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1990, at iii, iv (1990) [hereinafter 1990 HDR].
98
JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at 187.
What was the state of the world — or, more specifically, the world of
development policy — at that time (i.e. the late 1980s)? This was the period
of structural adjustment, and human development can rightly be seen as a
reaction against these policies, and the ideas on which they were based. It
was also a reaction against the predominance of concern for economic
growth, and more specifically against the policies of structural adjustment.
McNeill, supra note 92, at 10. For further description of the motivation behind the
creation of the HDRs, see generally Ponzio, supra note 95.
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inequality, public finance, participation, gender, economic
growth, consumption, globalization, technology, culture,
99
human rights, and international reform and cooperation.
The introduction of the HDR led to the production of individual
country human development reports, to the writing of “[n]umerous
books and articles about human development,” to the launch of the
Journal of Human Development in 2000, and to the creation of “[a]n
International Association for Human Development Capabilities [that]
now has a membership approaching a thousand or so members in
100
seventy countries . . . .” In short, “[t]here can be little doubt that the
concept of ‘human development’ has had a profound influence on
101
thinking about development.”
Even though the HDRs are produced independently of the
102
UNDP, the United Nations’ imprimatur has been instrumental in
the rapid spread of the idea of human development:
The UNDP’s administrative and financial support proved
critical for the rapidity with which human development ideas
were promoted and caught on worldwide. This made possible
a widespread program of advocacy and outreach. If the ideas
of human development had been developed and promoted

99

JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at 187.
Id. at 187–88. “In addition to the HDR, nearly 500 National Human
Development Reports have been produced. In his history of the UNDP, Craig Murphy
notes that on 29 November 2005, the Google search engine found two million pages
that mention at least one HDR — an indicator of its extraordinary success.” McNeill,
supra note 92, at 10 (citation omitted). Copies of more than 600 national human
development reports can be accessed through the UNDP’s web site. Human
Development Reports, UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports (follow “National
Reports” in the left frame) (last visited Aug. 5, 2012).
101
McNeill, supra note 92, at 6. Or, as Mahbub ul Haq himself put it:
100

“This book traces my intellectual journey — and the world’s — through a
profound transition in development thinking in recent decades . . . on the
quiet emergence of human development as a major focus of economic
thinking. Only 30 years ago, it would have been heresy to challenge the
economic growth school’s tacit assumption that the purpose of
development is to increase national income. Today, it is widely accepted
that the real purpose of development is to enlarge people’s choices in all
fields — economic, political, cultural.”
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 224 (quoting HAQ, supra note 1, at xvii); see HAQ,
supra note 1, at 43–45 (further describing the impact of the HDRs).
102
See supra note 97.
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only in a university or research institute, the results would
most probably never have been the same. The UN gave them
103
legitimacy and the media gave them attention.
C. Defining Human Development
1.

A Starting Point
104

Despite a lack of consensus regarding development policy, the
previous section demonstrates that “new trends are emerging” in the
development literature, including an increasing recognition that (1)
there is more to development than economic growth and per capita
income and (2) “captur[ing] the ‘missing’ dimensions . . . is
105
increasingly feasible.” But if economic growth provides us with a
narrow view of human development and there is a trend toward
taking a broader view, then what does that broader view of human
development look like?
To begin this description, let us start with a statement from
the first HDR:
People are the real wealth of a nation. The basic objective of
development is to create an enabling environment for people
to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives. This may appear to
be a simple truth. But it is often forgotten in the immediate
concern with the accumulation of commodities and financial
106
wealth.
It is worth quoting further from the 1990 HDR because it contains the
107
“richest introduction of any of the reports.” In an especially relevant
passage, the 1990 HDR explains how people are often forgotten in
debates over development:
Technical considerations of the means to achieve human
development — and the use of statistical aggregates to
103

JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at 191; see also Ponzio, supra note
95, at 105.
104
See supra note 92.
105
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 19–20; see Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 251
(describing the different competing/intertwined strands of the current development
discourse).
106
1990 HDR, supra note 97, at 9.
107
UNDP, supra note 72, at 3.
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measure national income and its growth — have at times
obscured the fact that the primary objective of development
is to benefit people. There are two reasons for this. First,
national income figures, useful though they are for many
purposes, do not reveal the composition of income or the real
beneficiaries. Second, people often value achievements that
do not show up at all, or not immediately, in higher measured
income or growth figures: better nutrition and health services,
greater access to knowledge, more secure livelihoods, better
working conditions, security against crime and physical
violence, satisfying leisure hours, and a sense of participating
in the economic, cultural and political activities of their
communities. Of course, people also want higher incomes as
one of their options. But income is not the sum total of
108
human life.
As this passage makes clear, economic growth is a means of advancing
human development but not the end of human development. In other
words, “[t]he purpose of development is to enlarge all human choices,
109
not just income.” Far from being “antigrowth,” however, the human
development approach focuses on both the quality and the
distribution of growth because, “to fully exploit the opportunities for
improved well-being that growth offers, it needs to be properly
110
managed.” Attention must be paid to enhancing people’s ability to
participate in growth, to the distribution of income and assets, to using
growth to support and sustain advances in human development that
could (and did) begin without economic growth, and to the
111
empowerment of people. Empowerment is important because, “[i]f
people can exercise their choices in the political, social and economic
spheres, there is a good prospect that growth will be strong,
112
democratic, participatory and durable.”

108

1990 HDR, supra note 97, at 9; see Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 236
(quoting HAQ, supra note 1, at 14) (similar statement).
109
HAQ, supra note 1, at 21.
110
Id.; see id. at 15 (“Rejecting an automatic link between income expansion and
flourishing human lives is not rejecting growth itself.”); see id. at 16 (“[T]he human
development paradigm embraces all of society — not just the economy. The political,
cultural and social factors are given as much attention as the economic factors. In fact,
study of the link between the economic and the non-economic environment is one of
the most fascinating and rewarding aspects of this new analysis . . . .”).
111
Id. at 20–21.
112
Id. at 22.
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A Dynamic Approach: Stability and Flexibility

Over the years, the individual HDRs have “emphasized different
aspects of human development,” but “the definition of human
113
Development
development has been fairly stable over time.”
economist Sakiko Fukuda-Parr nicely encapsulates the coexistence of
stability and flexibility in the human development approach when she
states that “[t]he evolution of the human development approach has
been a process where the ends have been defined consistently while
114
means have changed in response to new policy challenges.” In
keeping with the “dynamic, not calcified” approach of human
development, the 2010 HDR reaffirmed and refined the definition of
human development:
Human development is the expansion of people’s freedoms to
live long, healthy and creative lives; to advance other goals
they have reason to value; and to engage actively in shaping
development equitably and sustainably on a shared planet.
People are both the beneficiaries and drivers of human
115
development, as individuals and in groups.
As this passage indicates, political participation, cultural expression,
empowerment, and each individual’s role as an agent of change — and
not just “as [a] beneficiar[y] of economic and social processes” — are
116
all important components of human development. Conversely, the
concentration of political power in the hands of a few is worrisome,
making “changes in power relations central to the agenda for human
117
development.” In other words, democratic participation and debate
118
are centrally important to human development.
3.

Intellectual Grounding: Sen’s Capability Approach

This people-centered conceptualization of human development is
119
strongly grounded in Amartya Sen’s capability approach, which
113

UNDP, supra note 72, at 12. For a survey of the definition of human
development in each of these reports, see id. at 5–12.
114
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 235.
115
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 22; see UNDP, supra note 72, at 40.
116
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 237–38.
117
Id. at 240; see id. at 238.
118
SEN, supra note 71, at 31–34, 146–59; see generally AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA
OF JUSTICE 321–54 (2009).
119
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 16; see HAQ, supra note 1, at 16 (“[P]eople are
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focuses on “the ‘capabilities’ of persons to lead the kind of lives they
120
value — and have reason to value.” This notion of “capabilities” is,
in turn, grounded in the lived reality; that is, “[a] person’s ‘capability’
refers to the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible
121
for her to achieve.” For example, if we are to focus on a disabled
individual’s “real opportunity to pursue her objectives,” then we must
account for the fact that she might, in reality, have a lesser chance to
achieve her objectives than would “an able-bodied person with a
122
smaller basket of primary goods.” “Capability is thus a kind of
freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning
combinations (or, less formally put, the freedom to achieve various
123
lifestyles).”
Applying this approach to the development context, Sen “treats
124
the freedoms of individuals as the basic building blocks.” He views
individual freedoms as having both a constitutive and an instrumental
125
role in development. Sen explains the constitutive role of freedom
as follows:
The constitutive role of freedom relates to the importance of
substantive freedom in enriching human life. The substantive
freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to
avoid such deprivations as starvation, undernourishment,
escapable morbidity and premature mortality, as well as the
freedoms that are associated with being literate and
numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored
126
speech and so on.
Yet freedom is not only the “primary end” of development but also its

moved to centre stage. Development is analysed and understood in terms of
people.”); see generally Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-Being, in THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 30 (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993). For a summary of Sen’s work
on the capability approach as it relates to human development, tracing it from the
publication of a 1979 lecture through the publication of THE IDEA OF JUSTICE in 2009,
see UNDP, supra note 72, at 24–30. For a more general survey of Sen’s and others’
work on the capability approach, see Ingrid Robeyns, The Capability Approach: A
Theoretical Survey, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 93 (2005).
120
SEN, supra note 71, at 18.
121
Id. at 75.
122
Id. at 74.
123
Id. at 75.
124
Id. at 18.
125
Id. at 18–19, 36–40, 246.
126
Id. at 36.
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“principal means.” Thus, freedoms also have a role to play in
contributing, “directly or indirectly, to the overall freedom people
128
have to live the way they would like to live.” For example,
“development of the people . . . also facilitate[s] development by the
people; healthy and educated people [are] better able to make choices
129
for themselves.” Sen groups instrumental freedoms into five basic
categories: political freedoms (e.g., civil rights, democracy, and
freedom of the press), economic facilities (“opportunities . . . to utilize
economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production, or
exchange”), social opportunities (e.g., education and health care),
transparency guarantees (i.e., the openness necessary for mutual
130
trust), and protective security (i.e., the social safety net).
4.

The Dimensions of Human Development

As Fukuda-Parr explains, “the different dimensions of human
development are complementary. Much of the policy challenge for
human development lies in understanding the instrumentality of these
131
different dimensions.” Similarly, Sabina Alkire has observed:
Human development is multidimensional and its components
are interconnected. Thus analyses and policies to advance
human development take a holistic view. They identify how
powerful means such as economic growth best advance
human development across time. They clarify the sequence
and type of investments that expand key capabilities most
effectively. And they engage in periodic public debate about
132
values and priorities.
Echoing the definition of human development quoted above from the
2010 HDR, Alkire also notes that “[p]olicies to advance human
development often consider principles such as poverty reduction,
equity, efficiency, participation, the sustainability of outcomes across
time and on this planet, responsibility and respect for human
133
rights.”

127
128
129
130
131
132
133

Id.
Id. at 38.
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 241.
SEN, supra note 71, at 38–40.
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 236.
UNDP, supra note 72, at 44.
Id. at 42.
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Because human development is an ongoing project, sustainability
134
is a key concern, and one that is intimately linked with equity. After
all, if current advances come at the expense of future generations,
then “future generations are exposed to possibly catastrophic losses in
135
human development.” By the same token, however, “in our anxiety
to protect the future generations, we must not overlook the pressing
136
claims of the less privileged today.” Thus, we must be concerned
both about the equitable distribution of human development — that
is, of the opportunity to lead worthwhile lives — among those
currently inhabiting our planet (intragenerational equity) and about
its equitable distribution between current and future generations
137
(intergenerational equity). Or, as Helen Clark has pointedly put it,
“[w]e have a collective responsibility towards the least privileged
among us today and in the future around the world — and a moral
imperative to ensure that the present is not the enemy of the
134

See generally U.N. DEV. PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2011:
SUSTAINABILITY AND EQUITY: A BETTER FUTURE FOR ALL (2011) [hereinafter 2011
HDR] (focusing on issues of equity and sustainability, particularly as they relate to
the environment).
135
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 78.
136
Sudhir Anand & Amartya Sen, Human Development and Economic
Sustainability, 28 WORLD DEV. 2029, 2030 (2000).
137
See 2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 72 (“Human development cannot be built on
exploitation of some groups by others or on greater access to resources and power by
some groups. Inequitable development is not human development.”); id. at 19
(“Human development requires that people have the freedoms and choices to fulfil
[sic] their needs, desires and wants. Of course, people still unborn cannot make
decisions for themselves — but we can preserve the conditions of their future agency.
Human development also signals that intragenerational equity is as important as
intergenerational equity.”).
We have emphasized that sustainability is a matter of distributional equity
in a very broad sense, that is, of sharing the capacity for well-being between
present people and future people in an acceptable way—that is in a way
which neither the present generation nor the future generations can readily
reject . . . .
There would, however, be something distinctly odd if we were deeply
concerned for the well-being of the future — and as yet unborn —
generations while ignoring the plight of the poor today. The moral
obligation underlying sustainability is an injunction to preserve the capacity
for future people to be as well off as we are. This has a terribly hollow ring
if it is not accompanied by a moral obligation to protect and enhance the
well-being of present people who are poor and deprived.
Anand & Sen, supra note 136, at 2038 (emphasis omitted); see generally SEN, supra
note 71, at 248–52 (discussing sustainability).
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future.”

D. Measuring Human Development
1.

The Human Development Index

Contributors to the development literature have not only
discussed this broader view of human development in the abstract, but
they have also attempted to craft concrete metrics for measuring
human development. For example, in 1990, the first HDR introduced
the Human Development Index (HDI) in an effort to move past the
development literature’s narrow focus on economic growth and to
139
expand the scope of development measures. The HDI “proved to be
a very powerful complement to the concept of human development,”
140
turning out to be both eye-catching and controversial. The human
development approach was successful because of “its ability to bridge
the gap between research and policy. The concept ‘human
development’, and the associated HDI, are seen as very relevant to
141
development policy, while firmly grounded in academic terms.”
To better measure human development, the HDI combines
information along three different dimensions. Recognizing that
income has a role (but not the only role) to play in development, the
HDI considers (1) per capita income, (2) schooling (both mean years
of schooling and expected years of schooling), and (3) health (life
142
expectancy at birth). The HDI is meant to rival “the handy usability
of the crude GNP . . . but, unlike GNP, without being oblivious of
143
everything other than incomes and commodities.” Yet, as Sen
himself has cautioned, “the huge breadth of the human development
approach must not be confused, as it sometimes is, with the slender
144
limits of the HDI.”

138

Helen Clark, Foreword to 2011 HDR, supra note 134, at iv, v.
Amartya Sen, Introduction to 2010 HDR, supra note 6, at vi, vi. For a
description of the thinking behind the creation of the HDI, see generally HAQ, supra
note 1, at 47–50.
140
McNeill, supra note 92, at 7.
141
Id.
142
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 13 fig.1.1, 15 box 1.2.
143
Sen, supra note 139, at vi; see also JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at
191 (quoting Mahbub ul Haq making a statement to the same effect).
144
Sen, supra note 139, at vi. Indeed, in explaining why he opposes a “canonical”
list of capabilities but supports the use of lists of capabilities for specific purposes, Sen
relied upon the HDI as an example:
139
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The 2010 HDR marked the twentieth anniversary of the HDI’s
introduction. The team writing the 2010 HDR took this occasion to
engage in some retrospection and found a “lack of a significant
correlation between economic growth and improvements in health
145
and education.”
For instance, the 2010 HDR compared and
contrasted two countries—China and Tunisia—to demonstrate the
disconnect between economic growth and improvements in health and
education:
In 1970 a baby girl born in Tunisia could expect to live 55
years; one born in China, 63 years. Since then, China’s per
capita GDP has grown at a breakneck pace of 8 percent
annually, while Tunisia’s has grown at 3 percent. But a girl
born today in Tunisia can expect to live 76 years, a year
longer than a girl born in China. And while only 52 percent of
Tunisian children were enrolled in school in 1970, today’s
gross enrolment ratio is 78 percent, considerably higher than
146
China’s 68 percent.

[The HDI] was based on a very minimal listing of capabilities, with a
particular focus on getting at a minimally basic quality of life, calculable
from available statistics, in a way that the GNP or GDP failed to capture.
Lists of capabilities have to be used for various purposes, and so long as we
understand what we are doing (and in particular that we are getting a list
for a particular reason, related to a particular assessment, evaluation, or
critique), we do not put ourselves against other lists that may be relevant or
useful for other purposes.
Amartya Sen, Capabilities, Lists, and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation,
FEMINIST ECON., Nov. 2004, at 77, 79; see generally Gustav Ranis, Frances Stewart &
Emma Samman, Human Development: Beyond the Human Development Index, 7 J.
HUM. DEV. 323 (2006) (demonstrating that a broader set of measures is necessary to
assess a fuller definition of human development than the basic one employed for
purposes of the HDI, but concluding that the HDI is superior to both per capita
income and under-five mortality rates as a measure of a fuller definition of human
development).
145
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 4; see id. at 46–64 (explaining the data and
reasoning supporting this conclusion). The 2010 HDR draws a distinction between
levels of income and health and education, on the one hand, and changes in income
and health and education, on the other. There is a positive correlation between a
nation’s level of income and its level of health and education; however, there is no
significant correlation between change in income and change in health and education.
Id. at 47.
146
Id. at 47; see HAQ, supra note 1, at 40 (“For a long time, it was quietly
assumed that high levels of economic growth would automatically translate into high
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In fact, the 2010 HDR concluded that “human development is
different from economic growth and substantial achievements are
147
possible even without fast growth.”
2.

Unmasking Unequal Distribution of Human Development

Economic measures may not only be limiting but also misleading.
Per capita income, for instance, is nothing more than average income.
Averages such as this can mask as much — or sometimes more —
148
than they reveal. In the case of income, averaging can mask
profound levels of inequality in a society — and, of course, will
completely miss inequalities along other lines (e.g., health, education,
149
employment, and social acceptance). Indeed, in discussing the ways
in which average income can be misleading, the 2010 HDR points to
the United States as an example of a country where “mean income is
150
almost a third higher than median income, and the gap is growing.”
a. Taking Inequality into Account
To address such concerns, the 2010 HDR introduced a refined
151
version of the HDI — the Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI). After
taking inequality along each of the dimensions of the HDI into
account, “the global HDI of 0.62 in 2010 would fall to 0.49, which

levels of human development. But that does not necessarily happen, so there is no
automatic link between economic growth and human lives.”); id. at 40–41 (providing
examples).
147
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 5.
Although there is weak correlation between [economic prosperity and
human development], the data shows that many developing countries do
poorly on many social and human rights indicators in spite of growth. The
obverse is true as well; with clear priorities, countries can make significant
progress in human development even with slow economic growth, at least
for a decade or so. Yet the pursuit of growth is typically taken as the central
goal of economic policymaking. In contrast, the human development
approach concentrates on people-focused objectives and emphasizes that
economic and political actions should be treated as means to these human
ends, not as ends in themselves.
JOLLY, EMMERIJ & WEISS, supra note 92, at 190.
148
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 87.
149
SEN, supra note 71, at 107–10.
150
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 72.
151
Id. at 7.
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represents a drop from the high to the medium HDI category.” In
2010, the average loss in HDI due to inequality was 22%, and the
153
losses ranged from a low of 6% to a high of 45%.
A few examples may help to underscore the impact of inequality
on measuring human development. Taking inequality into account,
the United States would see its HDI drop by more than 11%, and it
154
would fall nine places in the HDI ranking. The Republic of Korea
would see its HDI drop by nearly 17%, and it would fall 18 places in
155
the HDI ranking. Brazil would see its HDI drop by 27%, and it
156
would fall 15 places in the HDI ranking.
b. Taking Gender Inequality into Account
The 2010 HDR also introduced a more refined measure of gender
157
inequality — the Gender Inequality Index (GII). The GII takes
account of three dimensions: (1) women’s reproductive health
(through maternal mortality ratios and adolescent fertility rates), (2)
women’s
empowerment
(through
national
parliamentary
representation and educational attainment), and (3) women’s labor
158
force participation. As measured by the GII, the average loss in
achievement for the ten countries closest to gender equality was 23%
while the average loss in achievement for the ten countries farthest
159
from gender equality was 79%.
Again, a few examples will help to underscore the impact of
gender inequality on measuring human development. The United
States ranks 4th in the HDI but only 37th in the GII, with a 40% loss
160
in achievement due to gender inequality. Qatar ranks 38th in the
HDI (placing it in the very high human development category) but
ranks 94th in the GII, with a 67% loss in achievement due to gender

152

Id.
Id. at 87.
154
Id. at 152.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 153.
157
Id. at 89–94.
158
Id. at 91 fig.5.3. Naturally, this measure fails to capture other dimensions of
gender inequality, including occupational segregation, the gender wage gap, and the
experience of non-elites as well as women’s “time use, access to assets, domestic
violence and local-level empowerment.” Id. at 92, 94.
159
Id. at 93.
160
Id. at 156.
153
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inequality. More startlingly, Saudi Arabia ranks 55th in the HDI
(placing it in the high human development category) but ranks 128th
162
in the GII, with a 76% loss in achievement due to gender inequality.
Mexico ranks 56th in the HDI (also placing it in the high human
development category) but ranks 68th in the GII, with a nearly 58%
163
loss in achievement due to gender inequality.
3.

Further Enriching Human Development Measures

The 2010 HDR candidly recognizes the limits of these measures,
stating that, “as with any aggregate measure and international
comparison, it simplifies and captures only part of what human
164
development entails.” There is much more to human development
165
“than basic needs and social sector development.”
Thus, the
purpose of the HDI and the related measures discussed above “is not
to build an unassailable indicator of well-being — it is to redirect
attention towards human-centred development and to promote
166
debate over how we advance the progress of societies.” Among
other dimensions that the 2010 HDR acknowledges are important to
human development are human rights and the political and social
empowerment of groups of people, sustainability of production and
impact on the environment, well-being, the availability of decent
work, and addressing threats to the human development that has
167
already been achieved. In fact, the 2010 HDR included six new
168
statistical tables that cover these additional dimensions.
161

Id.
Id. at 157.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 13.
165
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 237.
166
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 13; see Amartya Sen, Human Rights and
Capabilities, 6 J. HUM. DEV. 151, 159 (2005) (“[T]he ‘Human Development Index’ was
based on a very minimal listing of capabilities, with a particular focus on getting at a
minimally basic quality of life, calculable from available statistics, in a way that the
Gross National Product or Gross Domestic Product failed to capture.”).
167
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 17–19, 22, 85; see generally Sen, supra note 166
(describing the separate, yet complementary nature of human rights and the
capabilities approach).
168
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 137; see HAQ, supra note 1, at 67–75 (discussing
the importance of, and potential metrics to be included in, a political freedom index,
notwithstanding the controversy surrounding the creation of such an index). But cf.
Philip Alston, Towards a Human Rights Accountability Index, 1 J. HUM. DEV. 249
(2000) (prepared for the UNDP Human Development Report Office) (questioning
the feasibility of constructing an index comparing human rights performance among
162
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169

Moreover, as mentioned above, “there is not one ‘fixed and
forever’ list of relevant dimensions or capabilities. This flexibility
allows human development to be relevant in different cultural and
national contexts. It also enables applications that address ‘rich’
170
countries and persons as well as poorer people and countries.”
Providing the intellectual basis for this observation, Amartya Sen
opposed a fixed list of dimensions of human development because
that would be “to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation
171
on what should be included and why.” Mahbub ul Haq, “the pioneer
172
of the ‘human development revolution,’” also “often spoke about
human development as an ‘intellectual journey’, along which new
173
concepts, measures, and policy proposals would emerge.”
E. Lessons from the Development Literature
This “intellectual journey” has much to teach contributors to tax
reform debates. Most immediately, the human development approach
helps us to recognize that economic growth is a poor proxy for human
progress. Yet, notwithstanding that the human development approach
is designed to displace economic growth as the measure of human
development, it does not reject the importance of economic growth to
human development. Rather, the human development approach takes
a holistic view and situates economic growth in context by recognizing
that, even though economic growth may be a means to advance
human development, there is far more to human progress than merely
174
increasing average income. It will be important for us to carry this
idea of a more holistic view with us as we move into a discussion (in
the next Part of this article) of what effects a more people-centered
approach might have on tax reform debates.
As we consider these effects, the human development approach
also has important lessons for us to keep in mind regarding the quality
countries and instead proposing an index of government accountability for human
rights performance — initially to the international community and eventually to the
people of the individual nation as well).
169
See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
170
UNDP, supra note 72, at 15 (citation omitted).
171
Sen, supra note 144, at 77; see also Sen, supra note 166, at 157–60.
172
Amartya Sen, Foreword to PIONEERING THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REVOLUTION, supra note 73, at x, x.
173
Fukuda-Parr, supra note 96, at 223.
174
As discussed above, this is a measure that, in any event, means little to those
on the wrong side of the average and to those who value aspects of their lives that are
unrelated to income.
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and distribution of development. In contrast to measures of economic
growth, which turn a blind eye to how the benefits of that growth are
distributed among the populace, the human development approach
recognizes that “[h]uman development is about sustaining positive
outcomes steadily over time and combating processes that impoverish
people or underpin oppression and structural injustice. Plural
principles such as equity, sustainability and respect for human rights
175
are thus key.”
In keeping with these principles, the human
development approach further recognizes the importance of
intergenerational equity:
If the basic concept is sustainable human development, each
generation must meet its needs without incurring debts it
cannot repay. That means avoiding the accumulation of
environmental debts (by polluting or exhausting natural
resources) as well as financial debts (through unsustainable
borrowing), social debts (by neglecting to invest in human
development) and demographic debts (by permitting
176
unchecked population growth or urbanization).
To anticipate the inevitable critiques from defenders of the status
quo, let me clearly state that, viewed from this perspective, human
177
development is not just a project for so-called developing countries.
In reality, all countries are “developing”:
[H]uman development pertains to all countries at all levels of
development and, indeed, to all people including the wealthy
and elite. Whereas the decision to give priority attention to
the poor or relatively deprived may be one feature of human
175

2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 2; see HAQ, supra note 1, at 16–20 (enumerating
equity, sustainability, productivity, and empowerment as key concepts for the human
development approach); Sen, supra note 172, at xi–xii (“The Human Development
Reports have to be judged, ultimately, not just as contributions to our knowledge and
understanding (which, of course, they are), but also as robust instruments for making
the world more liveable [sic] and less unjust. Not only did Mahbub make a pathbreaking contribution to an epistemological advance, but he also helped to turn a
page in informed practical reasoning.”).
176
HAQ, supra note 1, at 78.
177
See Stewart, supra note 2, at 173 (“Tax reform discourse . . . participates in the
conceptualization of developing and transition countries as ‘“backward,” “primitive,”
“feudal,” “medieval,” “developing country,” and “pre-industrial,”’ hence representing
them as deficient in relation to a ‘Western’ (i.e., ‘developed,’ or ‘international’)
norm.” (quoting SARA MILLS, DISCOURSE: THE NEW CRITICAL IDIOM 114, 117
(1997)).
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development in national applications — and commendable in
them — one could also imagine a group meeting of OECD
country leaders who wished to support the well-being of their
citizens rather than merely add to their GDP. This too, would
178
be human development.
In emphasizing the universality of the human development approach,
this passage unfortunately glosses over the fact that countries are not
monoliths but groups of people. In other words, the divide between
wealthier and poorer countries is not the only important divide. Even
within wealthier countries such as the United States, the wealthy and
privileged are only a portion of the population (and, numerically, may
constitute only a small portion of the population). These internal
divisions are also important to discussions of human development
because “[t]he discipline of universalism requires us to extend the
same concern for all human beings — irrespective of race, class,
179
gender, nationality, or generation.” Or, as Sen has put it, even
though the human development approach applies to all countries, it
180
“is first and foremost an ally of the poor” and disadvantaged.
Indeed, by some measures of human development, there are
segments of the U.S. population that are worse off than those in socalled developing countries. For example, Amartya Sen points out
that, although African Americans are on average richer than people in
the so-called third world, they “have an absolutely lower chance of
reaching mature ages than do people of many third world societies,
181
such as China, or Sri Lanka, or parts of India.” Sen correctly notes
that “the presence of such intergroup contrasts within the richer
countries can be seen to be an important aspect of the understanding
182
of development and underdevelopment.” Mahbub ul Haq notes that
the 1993 HDR “brought out the HDI disparity among whites, blacks
and hispanics [sic] in the United States. It pointed out that, if
considered as separate nations, whites would outrank all other
countries, blacks would rank number 31 (after Trinidad and Tobago),

178

UNDP, supra note 72, at 53; see 1990 HDR, supra note 97, at 11 (“Human
development is, moreover, concerned not only with basic needs satisfaction but also
with human development as a participatory and dynamic process. It applies equally to
less developed and highly developed countries.”); SEN, supra note 71, at 6, 21–24,
126–27, 240–42, 285, 297–98.
179
Anand & Sen, supra note 136, at 2040.
180
SEN, supra note 71, at 144.
181
Id. at 6; see id. at 21–24 (containing a fuller explanation of this point).
182
Id. at 6.

INFANTI.FINAL.DOC

240

10/23/2012 6:03 PM

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. XXXII:205
183

and hispanics [sic] would rank number 35 (next to Estonia).” Haq
also notes that “gender-adjusted HDI comparisons have revealed the
184
shocking reality that no country treats women as well as men.”
Thus, it is worth underscoring that, by eschewing misleading averages
and placing people at the center of the discussion, the human
development approach helps us to bring the most vulnerable — for
example, the poor, women, ethnic and racial minorities, and sexual
minorities — to the front and center of discussions about
185
development, no matter what country is concerned.
At the beginning of his book Reflections on Human Development,
Mahbub ul Haq makes an interesting observation that applied to the
development debate then and applies equally to our tax reform
debates now:
Yet our preoccupation as economists is largely with saving
and investment, exports and imports — and, of course, with
that most convenient abstraction of all: the gross national
product. When we do come to recognize the contributions of
human beings as a means of development, we tend to treat
186
them as almost residual elements.
Rather than focusing on economic abstractions and treating real
people as residual elements of development, the time has come for us
to stop chanting the mantra of economic growth, to learn from the
journey in the development literature away from an unbending focus
on economic growth, and to return to an old idea that is new again by
187
placing people at the heart of tax reform debates. It is to this task
that we turn next.
IV. SHIFTING THE FOCUS OF THE TAX REFORM DEBATE
What would the tax system look like if we put people (rather than
183

HAQ, supra note 1, at 55.
Id.
185
2010 HDR, supra note 6, at 5–6; see 2011 HDR, supra note 134, at 1
(“Disadvantaged people are a central focus of human development.”).
186
HAQ, supra note 1, at 4.
187
“The rediscovery of human development is not a new invention.” Id. at 13.
Haq traces “[t]he idea that social arrangements must be judged by the extent to which
they promote ‘human good’ . . . [back] to Aristotle.” Id. He then traces it forward
through the writings of Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Robert Malthus, Karl Marx,
and John Stuart Mill. Id. For a similar tracing, see Anand & Sen, supra note 136, at
2030–31.
184
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economic growth) at the center of tax reform debates? How would
our tax system change if it were viewed not simply as a means of
encouraging economic growth for the benefit of a few but as one
instrument (among many) for advancing human development for all?
What changes would be made to the tax system if we were to place
those who are most disadvantaged in our society (instead of those who
are most privileged) at the center of the debate?
These are the basic questions raised by this fundamental shift in
the focus of the tax reform debate. In this short space, I can only hope
to begin to ponder these questions. Thus, I have chosen to offer some
preliminary thoughts in just one specific area, albeit an area of now
seemingly perennial concern in U.S. debates over tax reform. This
Part discusses the once again rising din of calls to eliminate tax
expenditures. Eliminating tax expenditures — what are commonly
referred to as tax “loopholes” or, even more pejoratively, “special
188
interest loopholes” — has become the holy grail of tax reform.
Often, the crusade to close loopholes is portrayed as a means to an
end — broadening the tax base in order to lower tax rates as a growth189
enhancing measure. As we will see, placing people at the center of
tax reform debates has important ramifications in this area.
A bit of background is necessary before entering into a discussion
of what a people-centered approach might have to say about tax
expenditures. Accordingly, this section begins with a discussion of the
popularization of tax expenditure analysis during the 1960s and 1970s
as well as antecedent debates regarding the need to close loopholes in
an effort to move toward a comprehensive tax base. Given that
background and taking a holistic view that is in keeping with the
human development approach, I then proceed to suggest that we
188

“Too often the term ‘special interest loopholes’ has been used as a synonym
for tax expenditures.” John L. Buckley, Tax Expenditure Reform: Some Common
Misconceptions, 132 TAX NOTES 255, 256 (July 18, 2011).
189
“The Tax Reform Act of 1986 represented the crowning achievement in the
forty-year effort to accomplish rate reduction alongside meaningful base broadening.”
Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Home Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 274 (2010)
(footnote omitted); see also id. at 255 (“Trading tax reform for tax cuts became the
rallying cry for reformers of all stripes.”); OECD, supra note 3, at 84 (“[A]
broadening of the tax base increases tax revenues which can finance tax rate
reductions, leading to further efficiency gains and reductions in tax avoidance and
evasion incentives.”); Gleeson & Pierson, supra note 47 (“House Speaker John A.
Boehner, R-Ohio, on September 15 called for the Joint Select Committee on Deficit
Reduction to propose broad-based tax reform that would lower income tax rates for
individuals and corporations.”).
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should call a truce in the war on tax loopholes because tax
expenditures are not some alien presence invading the tax domain but
are a normal and natural part of the tax laws. Finally, I turn to
discussing the impact on tax expenditures (and tax reform debates
more generally) of shifting people — and, particularly, the most
disadvantaged among us — to the center of the debate.
A. Tax Expenditures: Some Necessary Background
During the 1960s and 1970s, Stanley Surrey (at times, along with
190
co-author Paul McDaniel) popularized tax expenditure analysis.
Surrey began speaking about the tax expenditure concept while
191
serving in the Treasury Department in 1967. In less than a decade,
he spurred Congress to incorporate tax expenditure analysis into the
192
annual budgeting process. As Bernard Wolfman has remarked:
Writers have not generally used quotation marks around the
term “tax expenditure” since 1974, when Congress, spurred
by Surrey, adopted the first tax expenditure budget. A rather
broad spectrum of people now understand that the income
tax system is used extensively to confer monetary benefits as
real and as preferential as those conferred by direct
expenditure, and that tax expenditures may be less open to
debate, to scrutiny, and to review because they are tucked
193
away in the 3,000-page tax code.
Simply put, tax expenditure analysis “bifurcates tax provisions
into two categories: (1) structural provisions and (2) tax preferences
194
or tax penalties.” Structural provisions are those that form a
190

Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis,
Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 707,
717–19 (2005); see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax
Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 441
(2008) (stating that Surrey and McDaniel’s work “succeeded in making TEA [tax
expenditure analysis] a fixture in American income tax debates.”).
191
Bernard Wolfman, Tax Expenditures: From Idea to Ideology, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 491, 491 (1985) (reviewing STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX
EXPENDITURES (1985)).
192
Infanti, supra note 190, at 717–19; Wolfman, supra note 191, at 497;
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, §§
3, 202, 301, 308, 88 Stat. 297, 299, 304, 306, 313 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §
1302, 2 U.S.C. § 602, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1329 (2011)).
193
Wolfman, supra note 191, at 497.
194
Infanti, supra note 190, at 719.
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necessary part of the revenue-raising structure of the tax.

In contrast, tax preferences and penalties constitute a
residual category and include all provisions that are not
considered to be structural in nature. Because tax preferences
and penalties depart from the normative tax structure, they
have the effect of either (1) providing governmental
assistance to taxpayers by reducing their normative tax
burden or (2) exacting a penalty from taxpayers by increasing
their normative tax burden. Proponents of the tax
expenditure concept reach this conclusion by separating tax
preferences and penalties into their component parts.
Under tax expenditure analysis, each taxpayer can be
viewed as paying to the government the tax due under the
normative income tax. Then, taxpayers who are entitled to
tax preferences can be viewed as having received a payment
from the government equal to the amount of the preference,
and taxpayers who are subject to tax penalties can be viewed
as having been required to make an additional payment to
the government equal to the amount of the penalty. In the
case of tax preferences, these two payments are, in practice,
simply netted out for the sake of expediency (i.e., the tax
payment from the taxpayer is simply reduced by the amount
that the government owes the taxpayer). Thus, under tax
expenditure analysis, tax preferences and penalties are the
equivalent of direct expenditure programs and penalties,
196
respectively.
Focusing their attention mainly on tax preferences rather than tax
197
penalties,
Surrey and McDaniel sometimes described tax
expenditure analysis as a neutral tool to aid policymakers in deciding
between spending through direct programs and spending through tax
198
preferences. Quite often, however, they embraced a more absolutist
view of tax preferences, touting their endemic inequity and
199
inefficiency and calling for a nearly blanket elimination of them.
195

Id. at 720.
Id. at 721–22 (footnotes omitted).
197
Id. at 725.
198
Id. at 730–31.
199
Id. at 731–36; see Fleming & Peroni, supra note 190, at 441–42 (“Indeed, for
Surrey, the list of acceptable tax expenditures was so short that the practical effect of
TEA was to reject almost any income tax provision characterized as a tax
196
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The following paragraphs briefly summarize the reasons why Surrey
and McDaniel took such a dim view of tax preferences on equity and
efficiency grounds.
Surrey and McDaniel found tax preferences to be inequitable for
a number of reasons. First, tax preferences that take the form of an
exclusion or deduction result in an “upside-down” distribution of the
200
tax benefit. In other words, because the value of deductions and
exclusions is directly related to a taxpayer’s marginal tax rate,
taxpayers with higher marginal tax rates reap greater benefits from
deductions and exclusions than taxpayers with lower marginal tax
201
rates. Second, tax preferences that take the form of exclusions,
deductions, or exemptions “automatically exclude nontaxpayers from
202
receiving any benefits whatsoever.” Third, tax preferences treat
“taxpayers with the same level of income differently based on the uses
203
to which they put their income.”
Surrey and McDaniel found tax preferences to be inefficient on a
number of different grounds. They argued that some tax preferences
are inefficient because they do not induce the desired behavior but
merely pay the taxpayer to engage in behavior that she would have
204
engaged in even without the tax benefit. They argued that other tax
preferences are inefficient because their cost (i.e., the foregone tax
revenue) exceeds their benefit (i.e., the value of the behavior
205
induced). And they argued that some tax preferences are inefficient
because they provide a tax benefit to middlemen who are to deliver
206
the government assistance to the intended beneficiary.
For Surrey and McDaniel, eliminating tax preferences would have
207
the collateral benefit of simplifying the tax system. The tax system is
inherently complex because it “must track the complexity of the
208
myriad of economic arrangements that taxpayers create.” Surrey
and McDaniel argued that tax preferences unnecessarily add to this
complexity by importing into the income tax all of the additional

expenditure.”).
200
Infanti, supra note 190, at 732.
201
Id. at 728.
202
Id. at 732.
203
Id. at 733.
204
Id.
205
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id.
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They further
complexities associated with spending programs.
argued that these additional complexities are multiplied when “tax
reformers seek to limit the adverse effects of the tax expenditure on
tax equity. The net result is a tax system of ever-increasing complexity
and financial assistance programs that are often irrational and
210
sometimes counterproductive.”
211
Even before Stanley Surrey coined the term “tax expenditure,”
however, Boris Bittker had penned an article describing the repeated
attacks on “the ‘exceptions,’ ‘preferences,’ ‘loopholes,’ and ‘leakages’
in the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code” following
212
World War II. According to Bittker, the “‘comprehensive tax
base’ . . . ha[d] come to be the major organizing concept in most
serious discussions of our federal income tax structure” during that
213
period. In fact, many of the same arguments that Surrey and
McDaniel later proffered against tax preferences had already been
214
made by these CTB advocates.
In contrast to Surrey and McDaniel and the earlier CTB
advocates, Bittker argued that moving toward a CTB patterned after
the Schanz-Haig-Simons economic definition of income would be no
215
panacea. He contended that a CTB would not improve our tax
216
system by reducing its complexity. To the contrary, he argued that a
209

Id.
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 191, at 93.
211
Infanti, supra note 190, at 717; Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax
Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 200 (2004) (dating Surrey’s
speech in which he called for a “tax expenditure budget” to November 1967).
Bittker’s article appeared months earlier in the March 1967 issue of the Harvard Law
Review. See infra note 212.
212
Boris I. Bittker, A “Comprehensive Tax Base” as a Goal of Income Tax
Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 925 (1967).
213
Id.
214
Compare id. at 926–27 with Infanti, supra note 190, at 731–36.
215
See Bittker, supra note 212, at 933 (“I do not suggest that the advocates of the
‘broad base’ approach have explicitly asserted that the way to extirpate all
‘preferences’ and thus to ‘restore’ the tax base is to repeal all substantive parts of
existing law except section 61(a) and the business expense and loss provisions, or to
enact the Haig-Simons or National Income Division definition. These seem to me the
directions in which they point, however, and I have found in their writings no other
standards by which ‘preferences’ can be infallibly identified.”). Notably, Bittker
employed the Schanz-Haig-Simons definition of income as a foil throughout his
article, and Surrey and McDaniel clearly adopted that definition as their starting point
in separating out the structural provisions of the income tax from tax preferences and
penalties. Id. passim; Infanti, supra note 190, at 720.
216
Bittker, supra note 212, at 934 (“[T]hose who continue, in defiance of all
210
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CTB “would be a disaster” because tax preferences are an
unavoidable part of our tax system. The key is not to eliminate all
preferences but to examine each of them separately to determine
which should be kept and which should be discarded. Or, in Bittker’s
own words: “[T]here are ‘preferences’ and ‘preferences’; some are
objectionable, some are tolerable, some are unavoidable, and some
are indispensable. A truly ‘comprehensive’ base, in short, would be a
217
disaster.”
Bittker further criticized the CTB advocates for their logical
inconsistency. CTB advocates openly attacked some preferences and
loopholes (e.g., the exclusions for municipal bond interest and social
218
security payments) but ignored others that a rigorous application of
CTB would also require to be eliminated (e.g., the personal and
dependency exemptions, the exclusion for life insurance, and the
219
exclusion for gifts and bequests). But logical inconsistency was not
unique to CTB advocates operating before Stanley Surrey came onto
the scene. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (1986 Act), which is now often
remembered as a golden moment of base broadening through the
220
closing of loopholes, was more an exercise in political horse trading
experience, to hope for a simplified tax structure in a complex society are doubly
deluded, in my view, if they believe that a CTB will make a significant contribution to
simplification. Most of our troublesome complexities concern issues that are either
independent of the definitional criteria or unavoidable once we accept the departures
that even the most committed believers in a CTB accept as desirable or necessary.”).
217
Id. at 982.
218
Id. at 934.
219
Id. at 940–46.
220
See, e.g., Jeremy Scott, How Much of TRA ‘86 Remains Intact After 25 Years?,
133 TAX NOTES 261, 261 (Oct. 17, 2011) (“The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was a
landmark achievement. It greatly simplified the tax code, eliminating numerous tax
expenditures and lowering rates. . . . [T]he ghost of 1986 still haunts tax reform efforts
today. But repeating the success of 1986 in today’s climate might not be possible.”);
Jeremy Scott, Taxes, Debt, and Passing the Buck, 131 TAX NOTES 773, 773 (May 23,
2011) (“Much of the tax reform debate seems to be focused on how to recreate the
1986 effort to broaden the base and lower rates. In fact, the Simpson-Bowles
commission’s proposal essentially tried to do just that by eliminating tax expenditures
and dramatically lowering personal and corporate income tax rates.”); Daniel N.
Shaviro, 1986-Style Tax Reform: A Good Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 131 TAX
NOTES 817, 817 (May 23, 2011) (“TRA 1986 has remained a canonical symbol of highminded legislative achievement.”); id. at 842 (“The startling success of the 1986 tax
reform process continues to transfix modern-day proponents of income tax base
broadening.”); Joseph J. Thorndike, Historical Perspective: Why Liberals Should Like
Tax Reform, 129 TAX NOTES 1172, 1172 (Dec. 13, 2010) (“In 1986 the stars aligned
and champions of classic tax reform found an opening for their agenda. Leveraging
popular outrage over ‘loopholes,’ the reformers of 1986 defied the iron rules of
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than an attempt to move toward a theoretically perfect and logically
221
consistent CTB devoid of tax expenditures.
Bittker was an early — but far from the only — critic of tax
222
expenditure analysis. I have undertaken a relatively comprehensive
223
summary of these critiques elsewhere.
For purposes of this
discussion, it is important to note that many of the critiques of tax
expenditure analysis revolve around the (in)feasibility of drawing a
line between (1) the structural provisions of the income tax and (2)
224
tax preferences. Yet, notwithstanding a long parade of critics over a
span of decades, talk of closing loopholes and broadening the tax base
has not abated, but only grown more frequent.
The increasing focus on tax expenditures should come as no
surprise. After all, the absolute number of tax expenditures doubled
225
between 1974 and 2004.
In addition, measuring the resulting
revenue losses as a share of gross domestic product, tax expenditures
recovered more than half of the decline that followed the 1986 Act’s
226
hallowed efforts at closing loopholes. Furthermore, from 1996
through 2003, the outlay equivalent for tax expenditures (i.e., the
amount that it would cost to operate an equivalent direct spending

lawmaking and influence peddling. It was truly remarkable, a once-in-a-generation
achievement.”).
221
See generally JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT
GUCCI GULCH: LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS, AND THE UNLIKELY TRIUMPH OF TAX
REFORM (1987).
222
J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be
Divorced from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the “New Paradigm” and Its
Denouement, 30 VA. TAX REV. 135, 140–41 (2010) (describing the general tone of the
literature on tax expenditures as “disparaging”).
223
Infanti, supra note 190, at 736–44; see Fleming & Peroni, supra note 190, at
443 (“TEA was rigorously criticized from its inception and continues to draw negative
reviews.”).
224
Infanti, supra note 190, at 737; Fleming & Peroni, supra note 222, at 142 (“The
strongest attacks . . . have focused on the TEA baseline.”).
225
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-690, GOVERNMENT
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY: TAX EXPENDITURES REPRESENT A
SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL COMMITMENT AND NEED TO BE REEXAMINED 19, 21–22
(2005). Interestingly, “[o]f the 146 tax expenditures listed by Treasury in the
President’s fiscal year 2006 budget, 32 percent were on the first list in 1974, 23 percent
were added between 1975 and 1986, and 45 percent were added since 1986.” Id. at 22.
226
Allison Rogers & Eric Toder, Trends in Tax Expenditures: 1985–2016, TAX
POLICY CTR. 8 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/
412404-Tax-Expenditure-Trends.pdf. For a discussion of the problems inherent in
summing up the revenue losses from tax expenditures, see id. at 2; U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 225, at 19–21.
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program) actually exceeded direct discretionary spending. Indeed,
the Government Accountability Office observed that, in 2004, the
outlay equivalent for the home mortgage interest deduction (which is
classified as a tax expenditure) was $61.5 billion, “compared to $45
billion in outlays for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, which is responsible for, among other things, mortgage
228
credit and housing assistance programs.”
As one commentator has (however ahistorically) noted, “[t]he
current tax reform debate is unique in one respect: It seems to be
229
almost completely focused on tax expenditures.” Examples of this
rhetorical focus abound and can be easily found in the sources drawn
upon in the discussion in Part II.A above. For example, President
Bush’s tax reform panel counted tax expenditures among “the worst
230
features of our current income tax system.” Professor Graetz, in
advocating a move away from an income tax toward a consumption
tax, described our reliance on tax expenditures as being “about as
successful a solution to our national needs as handing out more
231
gunpowder at the Alamo.” More recently, House Speaker John
Boehner said that “‘[t]ax reform should deal with the whole tax code,
both the personal side and the corporate side, and it should result in a
code that is simpler and fairer to everyone’ . . . . He added that it
would be necessary to eliminate ‘deductions, credits, and special
232
carveouts [sic] in our tax code’ to accomplish that goal.”
Furthermore, Senator Carl Levin has made several proposals that he
has argued would move toward “ending unfair tax expenditures and
233
loopholes that disadvantage average taxpayers.” These views are
echoed and amplified by the general public, as evidenced by the
number of letters sent to the editors of newspapers in 2011 calling for
234
the elimination of tax loopholes, as talk of tax reform intensified.
227

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 225, at 35–36.
Id. at 40.
229
Buckley, supra note 188, at 257.
230
PRESIDENT’S ADVISORY PANEL ON FED. TAX REFORM, supra note 4, at 156.
231
GRAETZ, supra note 36, at 13.
232
Gleeson & Pierson, supra note 47, at 1204.
233
Id. (quoting Sen. Levin Sends 7 Tax Proposals to Joint Select Committee, 2011
TNT 180-47 (Sept. 15, 2011)).
234
E.g., Jim Craig, Letter to the Editor, Squeezed by Uncle Sam, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Apr. 19, 2011, at A12 (“First, we need to eliminate the tax loopholes that
millionaires and big corporations use to avoid paying taxes. Second, we need to stop
using the tax code to give away money. If you get back more than what you pay in
taxes, that’s not a tax refund, that’s public assistance. I have no problem with helping
the poor, but let’s stop using the tax code to do it.”); L. Pharris Knight, Letter to the
228
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B. Calling a Truce
235

the perennial focus on tax
As Boris Bittker suggested,
expenditures is not, in itself, a problem; rather, the problem lies in the
236
purpose of focusing on them. In tax reform debates, the purpose of
focusing on tax expenditures is to eliminate them. This and the next
section explain why, instead of aiming to eliminate most or all tax
expenditures, we should accept that tax expenditures are an
ineluctable part of our tax system. This explanation draws upon the
human development approach’s combination of theory with
pragmatism as well as its eschewal of blinkered vision in favor of
taking a holistic view of an issue. Once we accept that tax
expenditures have a natural place in our tax system, we can begin to
consider how to rehabilitate and reform tax expenditures so that they
coordinate well with nontax efforts to advance human development.
1.

Tax Exceptionalism

To paraphrase Antony in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar,
contributors to tax reform debates generally come to bury tax
237
expenditures, not to praise them. As the discussion in the previous
section illustrates, the movement to eliminate tax expenditures is

Editor, It’s Time to Stand Ground, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 30, 2011, at 21
(“It is also time to eliminate the tax loopholes for the rich like corporatejet [sic]
deductions, country-club memberships, car allowances and other perks. That is an
insult to me and every hardworking American out there.”); Glenn Lock, Letter to the
Editor, Don’t Discriminate, Tax it All, PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Dec. 6, 2011,
at A14 (“Tax it all. Eliminate tax loopholes.”); John Kujanek, Letter to the Editor,
Make Corporations Act in Our Interest, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 10, 2011, at A11
(“Congress must eliminate tax loopholes”); L. Dean Murphy, Letter to the Editor,
Debt-Reduction Tax and Other Ideas to Save the U.S., ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 7,
2011, at A19 (“Enact a corporate flat tax to eliminate tax loopholes.”); Gary Poduska,
Letter to the Editor, Eliminate Tax Loopholes, THE RECORD (Bergen County, N.J.),
Nov. 28, 2011, at A13 (“Rather than declaring class warfare, President Obama and
Congress should overhaul the 25,000-page tax code and eliminate all loopholes to
ensure that all Americans pay their ‘fair share’ of taxes.”); Pat Johns, Letter to the
Editor, Fairness Demands Federal Tax Reform, ROANOKE TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011, at
A16 (“Congress needs to eliminate tax loopholes that the rich enjoy”).
235
See supra text accompanying note 216.
236
After all, as Amartya Sen has said, “[t]o ask how things are going and whether
they can be improved is a constant and inescapable part of the pursuit of justice.”
SEN, supra note 118, at 86.
237
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2 (“I come to bury Caesar,
not to praise him.”).
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motivated — explicitly or implicitly and to a greater or lesser extent
— by the notion that the income tax can be made fairer, more
efficient, and more administrable by adopting “a ‘neutral, scientific
238
Naturally, academic
[i.e., economic] definition of . . . income.’”
commentators are the ones who tend to rely explicitly upon an
economic or “scientific” definition of income as their baseline in
239
critiquing tax expenditures. Lay commentators (whether politicians
or members of the general public) do so only implicitly, as they
advocate for the elimination of tax “loopholes” — a pejorative term
that evokes a gap in, or departure from, the theoretically appropriate
240
tax base. Moreover, the call to eliminate tax expenditures in order
to move toward a more neutral, scientific vision of the tax base is
often selectively made, targeting some tax preferences but leaving
241
others untouched. In some cases, the reason for this selectivity is
242
243
unexplained; in others, it is seemingly a matter of self-interest;
and, in yet others, it is more principled (e.g., calling for the repeal only
244
of tax expenditures whose costs outweigh their benefits).
The basic problem with this view is that it is founded upon tax
“exceptionalism” — the notion that tax law is unique and different
245
from other areas of U.S. law. David Weisbach and Jacob Nussim
238

Abreu & Greenstein, supra note 3, at 321 (quoting Bittker, supra note 212, at
925); see also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110TH CONG., PUB. NO. JCX-3708, A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS 18 (Joint Comm. Print
2008) (“Surrey further believed that an examination of tax expenditures as if they
were spending requests would demonstrate that many of these provisions are
inconsistent with the goal of an equitable, efficient and simple income tax system.”).
239
See supra note 215.
240
See supra note 234.
241
See supra text accompanying notes 218–221.
242
See supra text accompanying notes 218–219.
243
See, e.g., Herman Campos, Letter to the Editor, Uphold Benefits for Veterans,
MONTEREY COUNTY HERALD, Nov. 11, 2011 (“All of this while refusing to eliminate
tax loopholes for big oil . . . .”); William Schreffler, Letter to the Editor, Remove
Loopholes, Shelters for Large Corporations, PATRIOT NEWS (Harrisburg, Pa.), Oct.
14, 2011, at A10 (“Instead of raising the tax rate, eliminate the tax loopholes, shelters,
credits and subsidies available to large corporations.”).
244
E.g., OECD, supra note 3, at 85–86; Fleming & Peroni, supra note 190, at 525–
28. For a listing of the relevant factors to take into account in performing this
cost/benefit analysis, see Fleming & Peroni, supra note 222, at 138–39.
245
For a number of examples showing the pervasiveness of the notion of tax
exceptionalism, see Anthony C. Infanti, LGBT Taxpayers: A Collision of Others, 13
GEO. J. GENDER & L. (forthcoming 2012). Fleming and Peroni disagree with this
characterization. Fleming & Peroni, supra note 222, at 175. But see infra text
accompanying note 250.
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have pointed out that “the only way one can make the arguments
made by CTB advocates is to treat the tax system as separate from the
246
rest of the government.” The Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT)
has embraced this view, asserting that:
There . . . is merit to the argument that tax expenditure
analysis reflects tax “exceptionalism” — the belief that the
tax system ordinarily ought not to be burdened with the sort
of ad hoc political compromises reflected on the face of much
spending legislation. In the view of the JCT Staff, however,
247
that “exceptionalism” is largely justified.
From this perspective, the path to achieving a just tax system lies in
setting tax apart from all other areas of law — rendering it neutral and
apolitical — and then hewing as closely as possible to a theoretically
248
perfect tax base. Thus, the tax laws should be burdened with the
task of achieving nontax ends — if at all — only on the rare occasion
when the tax laws can be shown to be the best vehicle for
249
accomplishing the task. Even in its mildest iterations, this view
privileges structural (i.e., “tax”) over nonstructural (i.e., “nontax”)
provisions in the tax laws, imposing burdens on nonstructural
provisions from which structural provisions are wholly exempt.
2.

A More Realistic Starting Point

To my mind, however, it is a serious mistake to start from the
premise that tax law is exceptional. Instead, the starting premise
should be a more holistic — and realistic — one that recognizes that
tax is not set apart from other areas of the law, from the spending side
of the fiscal system, or from social systems more generally; rather, it is
merely a part of this much larger sociolegal picture. A more holistic
starting premise is also more realistic for two primary reasons: (1) the
longevity of tax expenditures and (2) the expressive function of the
tax laws.

246

David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 968 (2004).
247
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 238, at 37.
248
Cf. SEN, supra note 118 (criticizing theories of justice that concentrate on the
creation of ideal institutions or sets of rules rather than on realized justice based on
comprehensive accounts of how institutions, rules, and choices will actually operate).
249
OECD, supra note 3, at 86–87; Fleming & Peroni, supra note 190, at 480.
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a. Longevity
Tax expenditures have been with us since the earliest days of the
modern U.S. federal income tax and have been the target of reformers
since at least the time when the income tax moved from being a
“class” tax to a “mass” tax. For example, the deduction for personal
interest — and, more particularly, home mortgage interest — dates
250
back to the inception of the modern federal income tax in 1913.
Furthermore, as described in the previous section, the battle to
eliminate tax expenditures has been going on for nearly seventy years
and, despite the increasing salience of tax expenditures, there is no
end in sight. After all, it has been nearly forty years since Congress
mandated the compilation of a tax expenditure budget as part of the
annual budgeting process in an effort to make tax expenditures more
251
salient to lawmakers. As mentioned above, in the first thirty years of
this heightened salience, the absolute number of tax expenditures was
252
not reduced but actually doubled.
b. Expressive Function
This leads us into a discussion of the expressive function of the tax
laws. Interestingly, Boris Bittker dated CTB advocates’ alarm about
the erosion of the tax base and attacks against tax loopholes to the
days following World War II. This coincides with the shift in the role
of the income tax from a “class tax” on the wealthy to a “mass tax”
253
that applied to the population more broadly. Prior to World War II,
the income tax only applied to the wealthiest Americans and “was
justified as a means of combating an ‘unjust concentration of wealth
254
and economic power.’”
As Carolyn Jones has explained, the
message conveyed by the income tax had a “punitive cast,” especially
“when it was enforced, at least for a time, by publicity of certain
250

See PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33025, FUNDAMENTAL
TAX REFORM: OPTIONS FOR THE MORTGAGE INTEREST DEDUCTION 3–5 (2005)
(describing the history of the home mortgage interest deduction and dating the
deductibility of home mortgage interest to 1913); Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So)
Little House on the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest
Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1347, 1351–52 (2000); Ventry, supra note 189, at 240–41.
251
See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
252
See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
253
See generally Carolyn C. Jones, Class Tax to Mass Tax: The Role of
Propaganda in the Expansion of the Income Tax During World War II, 37 BUFF. L.
REV. 685 (1989).
254
Id. at 733.
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information from taxpayers’ returns and when the tax affairs of the
nation’s wealthiest citizens were paraded before Congressional
255
hearings.”
(1) “Functional Necessity”
During World War II, the expressive function of the income tax
changed as it was converted from a form of punishment against
“‘economic royalists’” into the people’s chosen means for funding the
256
costs of war. As mentioned above, there had been tax “preferences”
before World War II; however:
Millions of new taxpayers joined the system, and they
demanded millions — well, thousands — of new preferences.
Most were reserved for the rich and famous, but others had a
more plebian quality. The mortgage interest deduction was a
principal concession — a feature of the tax system since 1913,
it took on new importance as homeownership soared in the
postwar era. Similarly, the tax-free treatment of health
insurance benefits found a broad constituency once unions
made employer-provided insurance a fixture of the modern
257
labor market.
Thus, in the early days of the income tax as a “mass tax,” tax
preferences were viewed as a “functional necessity” to make income
taxation palatable to a population that had previously viewed this tax
258
as a “rich man’s burden.”
The “functional necessity” of tax preferences has not waned with
time. For example, the home mortgage interest deduction has been
called “the ‘most sacred tax break in the code,’ the ‘third rail of tax
reform,’ a member of the ‘Holy Trinity of U.S. social programs,’ and
‘an American birthright’ so ‘sacrosanct’ that the ‘mere thought of
259
tampering with it was unpatriotic.’” Similarly, it has been said that
the deduction for charitable contributions is “politically
260
unassailable” and “almost a third rail in tax policymaking . . . .

255

Id.
Id. at 699, 733–36.
257
Joseph J. Thorndike, Two Cheers for Loopholes, 111 TAX NOTES 371, 371
(Apr. 17, 2006).
258
Id.
259
Ventry, supra note 189, at 234–35 (quoting a variety of sources).
260
Victor Thuronyi, Tax Expenditures: A Reassessment, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1155,
256
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[though] not quite as untouchable as the mortgage interest
261
deduction . . . .” Despite their erosion of the theoretically perfect tax
base, these tax expenditures have come to be seen as a politically
unassailable necessity.
(2) Mirroring Society
Tax preferences have thus been with us since the earliest days of
the income tax and took on the important role of a necessary
palliative following World War II — a role that is still relevant today.
But tax preferences were — and are — more than just a functional
necessity, they are a reflection of our society. Comparative law
262
scholars generally view law as a mirror of society. Naturally, there is
controversy regarding how closely law mirrors society; however, areas
of public law, such as tax law, are thought to be particularly closely
263
tied to the societies of which they are a product. Notwithstanding
264
the general bias toward viewing tax law as technical and apolitical,

1158.
261

Jeremy Scott, Transfer Pricing Rules Cost Both Jobs and Revenue, 128 TAX
NOTES 453, 454 (Aug. 2, 2010).
262
Anthony C. Infanti, The Ethics of Tax Cloning, 6 FLA. TAX REV. 251, 319
(2003).
263
Id. at 320–36 (describing the divergent views on legal “transplants” (or what I
have termed legal “cloning”) of Otto Kahn-Freund and Alan Watson as well as the
common ground that they share — in particular, Kahn-Freund’s belief that areas of
public law are particularly resistant to transplantation, Watson’s restriction of his
views regarding the ease of legal transplantation to areas of private law, and their
shared belief that a successful legal transplant requires knowledge of the recipient
legal environment).
264
Jinyan Li, Tax Transplants and Local Culture: A Comparative Study of the
Chinese and Canadian GAAR, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 655, 683–84 (2010); see
also id. at 670 (“The application of a tax rule, including the GAAR, is dependent on
the general legal environment in which tax laws are made and interpreted. There are
some fundamental differences between the general legal systems in Canada and
China that affect how the GAAR operates in reality.”); Assaf Likhovski, Is Tax Law
Culturally Specific? Lessons from the History of Income Tax Law in Mandatory
Palestine, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 725, 730 (2010) (“Tax law occupies an
ambiguous position between the more easily transferable areas of law and those areas
which are culturally specific, between the universal and the particular. On the one
hand, tax law, like other areas of commercial law, is often perceived as technical and,
therefore, less culturally specific than other areas. It should therefore prove to be
easily transferable. On the other hand, tax law is ultimately based on definitions and
notions which are culturally specific.”); Michael A. Livingston, Law, Culture, and
Anthropology: On the Hopes and Limits of Comparative Tax, 18 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 119, 121 (2005) (“Along these lines, ‘tax culture’ may be defined as
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even comparative tax scholars have come to embrace the notion that
tax law is culturally specific:
The level of sensitivity of tax rules to the local tax culture
differs based on the nature of the tax rule. One can imagine
that the ‘universal’ or ‘scientific’ rules, such as those based on
accounting or market exchanges, are less sensitive than those
‘indigenous’ rules that reflect political or social values, such as
265
progressivity, or tax expenditures for social programs.
The ties between tax law and American society can be seen in a
number of areas. For instance, the tax laws contain a number of
preferences that privilege homeowners over renters, including the
implicit exclusion of imputed rental income from gross income, the
allowance of a deduction for home mortgage interest, the allowance of
a deduction for real property taxes, and the exclusion from gross
income of a specified amount of gain on the sale of a principal
266
residence. These tax benefits for homeownership are often viewed
as a means of helping individuals realize the “American dream.”
Indeed, two years prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, President
Ronald Reagan “explicitly instructed the Treasury Department to
‘preserve that part of the American dream which the home mortgage
267
interest deduction symbolizes.’” When President Reagan released

the body of beliefs and practices that are shared by tax practitioners and policymakers in a given society and that provide the background or context in which tax
decisions are made, i.e., the noneconomic or at least nonquantifiable side of taxation,
which varies between societies even though the underlying economic principles are
largely the same. Tax culture is thus distinct from the general culture or even the legal
culture of a given society, although there is of course no clear line between them: for
example, the American frontier tradition, with its emphasis on independence and its
fascination with real or imagined risk-taking, plainly affects the public’s attitudes
toward taxation and as such exercises considerable influence on tax policy-makers.
But the two remain conceptually and practically distinct from one another.”).
265
See, e.g., Likhovski, supra note 264, at 761 (“[I]n fact law is both autonomous
and related to society . . . .”).
266
I.R.C. §§ 121, 163(h), 164(a)(1); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH
CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011–2015, at
36 (Comm. Print 2012); see, e.g., Jackson, supra note 250, at 1–2 (enumerating the tax
benefits of homeownership); Ventry, supra note 189, at 236 (“At the same time,
however, the 1913 income tax law violated this principle by excluding from gross
income imputed rent from owner-occupied housing, while also allowing offsets for
interest and property taxes on that nontaxable form of income.”).
267
Ventry, supra note 189, at 271–72 (quoting Lou Cannon, Reagan to Keep
Home Mortgage Tax Deduction, WASH. POST, May 11, 1984, at F1).
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his tax plan the next year, he proposed reforms to some of the thenexisting housing tax subsidies, but “immunized the [mortgage interest
deduction], calling it ‘central to American values’ and representative
of ‘America’s unequivocal commitment to private home268
ownership.’” Some twenty years later, President George W. Bush
echoed these sentiments:
[I]n the executive order that established the President’s
Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, one of the very few
restrictions was a request that the panel ‘recognize the
importance of homeownership and charity in American
society.’ Some analysts have concluded that the
Administration’s statement indicate[d] its support for
preserving the mortgage interest deduction along with all of
269
the other homeownership tax incentives.
In addition, the tax laws reflect “the extraordinary — probably
unique — centrality of the nonprofit sector in American social and
270
economic life.” In terms of tax preferences, the importance of
nonprofit organizations in American life is reflected in the income,
271
estate, and gift tax deductions for charitable contributions. The
perceived importance of charity in American society is not only
reflected in the quotation above from President Bush’s executive
order establishing his tax reform panel, but also in the tax reform plan
that President Reagan proposed some twenty years earlier. In his 1985
plan, President Reagan immunized the deduction for charitable
contributions from reform efforts on the ground that, like the
mortgage interest deduction, it too is “central to American values” —

268

Id. at 274 (quoting PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, THE PRESIDENT’S TAX
PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 4 (1985)).
269
Jackson, supra note 250, at 1 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg.
2323 (2005)).
270
John Simon, Harvey Dale & Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of
Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 267,
267 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2d ed. 2011).
271
I.R.C. §§ 170, 2055, 2522; STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
266, at 40, 42. But cf. William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income
Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 344–75 (1972) (arguing that, in many cases, the deduction
for charitable contributions is a refinement of an ideal income tax base rather than a
departure from it); Simon, Dale & Chisolm, supra note 270, at 273–74 (discussing the
work of others who view the exemption from tax for charitable organizations and the
deductibility of charitable contributions as serving a tax-base-defining function, but
recognizing that the “tax-base-defining rationales have not been widely embraced.”).
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in this case because of “America’s longstanding commitment to
272
charity and voluntarism.”
Perhaps less obviously to some, the tax laws reflect not only
American dreams but also some unpleasant American realities. Given
a long history of de jure and de facto discrimination on the basis of
race, it is no wonder that “[a]n air of discomfort has always permeated
273
discussions about race” in the United States. The same air of
discomfort surrounds discussions of — or, in some cases, the absence
274
of discussion of — sexual harassment.
Naturally, the air of
discomfort surrounding discussions of both race and gender
discrimination can be detected in the tax laws.
Strong and repeated legal condemnations of discrimination on the
basis of race and gender would seem to have made it abundantly clear
that invidious discrimination in employment is neither an ordinary nor
275
a necessary business practice. Yet, employees who recover damages
272

PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN, supra note 268, at 4.
Leo P. Martinez & Jennifer M. Martinez, The Internal Revenue Code and
Latino Realities: A Critical Perspective, 22 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 378 (2011);
see Jon Hanson & Kathleen Hanson, The Blame Frame: Justifying (Racial) Injustice in
America, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 457–59 (2006) (describing the media’s
discomfort with discussing the impact of Hurricane Katrina along lines of race and
class).
274
See Justine E. Tinkler, Resisting the Enforcement of Sexual Harassment Law,
37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1, 1 (2012) (using a small-scale empirical study to explore the
“familiar paradox about perceptions of sexual harassment: at the same time that
sexual harassment is widely perceived as wrong, the enforcement of policies and the
use of litigation as a strategy for redressing sexual harassment are often met with
resistance.”); Deborah Zalesne, Sexual Harassment Law in the United States and
South Africa: Facilitating the Transition from Legal Standards to Social Norms, 25
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 143, 176–79 (2002) (describing a backlash against a series of
U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding sexual harassment). The absence of
discussion of sexual harassment is evident in those workplaces, such as my own, in
which the required training is accomplished online, with absolutely no interaction
with another human being or discussion of these issues. University Training
Resources, U. OF PITTSBURGH, http://www.hr.pitt.edu/training-development/generalcourses-training-resources (last visited Aug. 9, 2012).
275
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2011) (prohibiting sex discrimination in the
setting of wages); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (prohibiting employment discrimination on
the basis of race and sex); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, §
2(1), 123 Stat. 5, 5 (statutorily overruling the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), on the ground that it
“significantly impairs statutory protections against discrimination in compensation
that Congress established and that have been bedrock principles of American law for
decades”); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) (upholding the
Internal Revenue Service’s revocation of the tax exemption of a university with a
273
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for discrimination on the basis of race or gender are required to pay
tax on those damages while their employers are permitted to deduct
those same damage payments as ordinary and necessary business
276
expenses. Drawing on tax expenditure analysis, Karen Brown has
argued that taxing the employee on these damages constitutes a tax
penalty (i.e., the employee is overtaxed because she is denied a
deduction for the costs associated with producing income in a
discriminatory workplace) while permitting an employer “a deduction
277
for expenses connected to discriminatory conduct seems a reward.”
When prohibitions against discrimination are juxtaposed with these
tax preferences and penalties, we can clearly see how the law mirrors
societal discomfort regarding racial and gender discrimination by
278
sending “mixed messages.”
Likewise (and perhaps more obviously), the privileging of the
different-sex married couple and the so-called traditional family in
American society — as well as the closely associated culture war over
same-sex marriage — are all reflected in the pervasive importance of
279
marital status in the tax laws. Marital status (and sexual orientation)
impact not only such structural provisions as the determination of the
280
taxable unit, but also the meting out of tax preferences such as the

racially discriminatory admissions policy on the ground that it was not “charitable”
and, in support of that decision, noting that, “[o]ver the past quarter of a century,
every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts of Congress and Executive
Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination
in public education”).
276
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (limiting the exclusion for damages based on personal
injury to those received on account of “physical injuries or physical sickness”); Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993) (indicating that a deduction “otherwise . . .
allowable under section 162 shall not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such
deduction would frustrate a sharply defined public policy”); Rev. Rul. 74-323, 1974-2
C.B. 40 (advertising expenses deductible by an employment agency even though the
advertising in question arguably violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
277
Karen B. Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral: New Tax Treatment of
Employment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 223, 261–
67 (1998).
278
See William D. Araiza et al., The Jurisprudence of Yogi Berra, 46 EMORY L.J.
697, 752 (1997) (describing the “mixed messages” sent when “federal law prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of gender, but the tax code provides
numerous incentives for a secondary wage earner (the spouse with lower earnings,
typically the wife) to work for no pay in the home instead of working in a paying job
outside the home, especially if the couple has children”) (footnotes omitted).
279
See ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND
THOSE WHO CARE ABOUT THEM) 136–66 (2007).
280
I.R.C. § 6013(a) (permitting “[a] husband and wife” to file a joint federal
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281

exclusion for employee fringe benefits, the exclusion for employer282
provided health insurance, and the exclusion for gain on the sale of
283
a principal residence. In each of these areas, taxpayers are treated
differently based on their marital status and sexual orientation — with
284
married different-sex couples being treated better than all others.
The longstanding presence and important expressive function of
tax expenditures together betray the quixotic nature of the battle to
achieve a more just tax system by closing tax loopholes in an effort to
approach ever closer to an ideal tax base. To achieve justice, we must
be concerned not only with theory but also with the operation of the
285
law in practice. In practice, tax law is both salient in the public
income tax return); Treasury Clarifies Filing Status of Individuals in Illinois OppositeSex Civil Unions, 2011 TNT 215-62 (Aug. 30, 2011) (indicating that an Illinois civil
union between a man and woman would be treated as a marriage for federal tax
purposes). In contrast, the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) currently
prohibits same-sex couples who are either married or parties to a civil union or
domestic partnership that is intended to be legally equivalent to marriage from being
similarly treated as a taxable unit. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §
3(a), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codifed at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012)). For the sake of simplicity,
in the text below, I will refer to couples who are legally married or who have entered
into a civil union or domestic partnership that is intended to be legally equivalent to
marriage as “married” and those who have not entered into any such relationship as
“unmarried.”
281
I.R.C. § 132(a)(1), (2), (b), (c), (h)(2); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
supra note 266, at 41.
282
I.R.C. § 106(a); Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1960); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1, 72
Fed. Reg. 46,421 (Aug. 20, 2007); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
266, at 42.
283
I.R.C. § 121(b)(2)(A)(i); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note
266, at 36; see Anthony C. Infanti, Bringing Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
into the Tax Classroom, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3, 14–15 (2009) (explaining how these
rules apply differently to same-sex and different-sex couples).
284
The constitutionality of section three of DOMA, which currently underpins
these differences in treatment, has been cast in doubt by a series of recent judicial
decisions. As of this writing, the parties in several of the cases have sought review of
these decisions in the U.S. Supreme Court. For a discussion of these cases and of the
possible worsening of the legal landscape after “equality” is achieved by striking
down section three of DOMA, see generally Anthony C. Infanti, The Moonscape of
Tax Equality (Sept. 8, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
285
See SEN, supra note 71, at 69 (“In general, the institutions have to be chosen
not only in line with the nature of the society in question, but also co-dependently on
the actual behaviour patterns that can be expected even if — and even after — a
political conception of justice is accepted by all.”). Sen critiqued Rawls’s approach to
justice on the same grounds:
In the Rawlsian system, the choice of the two principles of justice is meant
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imagination and highly politically charged, notwithstanding academic
assumptions and protestations that it is (or, at the very least, ought to
286
be) technical, neutral, and apolitical. Because tax law touches so
many areas of so many people’s lives, it has come to serve an
important expressive function. We use tax preferences and penalties
as a means of (consciously or unconsciously) expressing who we are —
and, in some cases, a view of how we would like to develop and whom
we would like to become. Thus, as illustrated above, whether in
arguments about the role of marriage in American society or as a
symbol of the American dream, tax law often plays an important
cultural role. Given this reality, the goal of tax reform should not be to
eradicate tax expenditures from the Internal Revenue Code but to
rethink and rehabilitate them so that they better reflect who we are
and how we would like to develop as a society.
C. “Reforming” Tax Expenditures
1.

Beginning a Public Discussion

With a starting point more grounded in reality, we can shift our
focus away from eliminating tax expenditures (in an effort to
approximate a theoretically perfect tax base) and toward reforming
our tax system as it actually operates (in an effort to reduce manifest
287
injustice and advance human development). A key first step toward
this end is to undertake a truly public discussion of what types of lives
288
we value and why we have reason to value them. In other words,
to ensure both the right choice of institutions as well as the emergence of
appropriate actual behaviour on the part of everyone, making individual
and social psychology thoroughly dependent on a kind of political ethics.
Rawls’s approach, developed with admirable consistency and skill, does
involve a formulaic and drastic simplification of a huge and multi-faceted
task — that of combining the operation of the principles of justice with the
actual behaviour of people — which is central to practical reasoning about
social justice. This is unfortunate since it can be argued that the relationship
between social institutions and actual — as opposed to ideal — individual
behaviour cannot but be critically important for any theory of justice that is
aimed at guiding social choice towards social justice.
Id.
286

Infanti, supra note 245.
Cf. SEN, supra note 71, at 20–22.
288
See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Oligarchy, American Style, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2011, at A31 (reacting to the Congressional Budget Office report discussed in Part I,
see CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 18, and stating “that extreme concentration of
income is incompatible with real democracy. Can anyone seriously deny that our
287
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focusing on the importance of agency and democratic participation to
289
the human development approach, we need to work together to set
our own agenda for advancing our development. An important part of
this discussion will involve addressing the equitable distribution and
sustainability of our extant and future development. That is, we must
particularly focus our attention on (1) how the disadvantaged in our
society are now faring and (2) how our decisions today will impact
future generations.
In keeping with the holistic view of the human development
approach, there must necessarily be a broad discussion that can, in
turn, form the basis for assessing the legal and nonlegal, tax and
nontax steps that can be taken to achieve these goals and advance our
development. The tax system will likely not be the sole means for
achieving these goals, but it certainly will have a role to play in
290
advancing our development. Accordingly, we should consider how
the tax system might be used to further our development as well as
how the role of the tax system coordinates with and either supports or
enhances other legal and nonlegal measures to be taken to advance
our development.
Tax and nontax legal coordination is not as foreign a concept as
one might think. In fact, in the wake of the passage of the Patient
291
Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care Act), the
Department of Treasury worked together with the Department of
Labor and the Department of Health and Human Services “to
develop regulations and other administrative guidance that will
respond to questions and assist stakeholders with implementation” of
292
the health care reform legislation. In developing certain standards,
the Affordable Care Act even explicitly required consultation with “a
working group composed of representatives of health insurancerelated consumer advocacy organizations, health insurance issuers,

political system is being warped by the influence of big money, and that the warping is
getting worse as the wealth of a few grows ever larger?”).
289
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 99, 112, and 115–118.
290
As should by now be clear, the purpose here is not to advocate achieving
social justice through the tax system rather than through direct expenditures or other
means. Instead, the purpose is to work with the tax system as it already exists and to
reform and improve upon it. The tax law clearly has a role to play in discussions of
human development and social justice. I am merely recognizing that role and
embracing it.
291
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
292
I.R.S. Notice 2011-36, 2011-21 I.R.B. 792, 792.
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health care professionals, patient advocates including those
representing individuals with limited English proficiency, and other
293
qualified individuals.” Moreover, all three Departments “entered
into a memorandum of understanding that, among other things,
established a mechanism for coordinating enforcement and avoiding
294
duplication of effort for shared jurisdiction.” Therefore, cooperation
and coordination among federal agencies (as well as between federal
agencies and nongovernmental stakeholders) as part of a broader
effort to advance human development is not a lofty aspiration; it is
already happening.
2.

An Example of an Area Ripe for Discussion

Without in any way preempting the necessary public discussion
and further recognizing that my purpose here is no more than to shift
the focus of tax reform discourse, I would simply like to provide one
example of an area that appears ripe for inclusion in this discussion. I
will also offer a few thoughts on proposals that we might entertain
when considering the role that the tax system (and, more particularly,
provisions that could be classified as tax expenditures) might play in
advancing human development in this area.
The area that I have in mind is housing. It comes to mind because,
as mentioned above, in 2004 the outlay equivalent for the home
mortgage interest deduction, which is just one of the tax provisions
295
encouraging homeownership,
far exceeded the outlays of the
296
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
This large
297
component of federal housing policy (or lack thereof) has come
under fire for failing to actually encourage homeownership and for
being regressive by disproportionately aiding those who least need
298
help; for disproportionately benefiting white taxpayers over African
299
for having “a close connection to
Americans and Latino/as;

293

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001, 124 Stat. at 130, 132; see
I.R.S. REG-140038-10, 2011-42 I.R.B. 537, 539 (proposed Aug. 22, 2011) (to be
codified at 26 C.F.R. §§ 54, 602) (mentioning these consultative efforts).
294
I.R.S. REG-140038-10, supra note 293, at 548 (footnote omitted).
295
See supra text accompanying note 266.
296
See supra text accompanying note 228.
297
See Mann, supra note 250, at 1393–94.
298
Id. at 1359–68.
299
Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal
Revenue Code, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 751, 774–76.
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300

proliferating [urban] sprawl”; and, in its home equity indebtedness
provision, for “amount[ing] to ‘a house-sized credit card’ for
‘consumer-type purchases, the very evil that the interest provisions of
301
the 1986 tax act were designed to eliminate.’”
If we were to put people — and particularly those among us
who are disadvantaged — at the center of discussions about housing,
we might not so narrowly focus on homeownership. For example,
rates of homeownership for African Americans and Latino/as are
302
significantly below those of whites, and a recent study found that
homeownership rates for transgender individuals in California were
303
far below the state average. Not everyone will either wish to or have
the means to purchase their own home. Perhaps a broader focus
would lead us to conclude that what we value is not just
homeownership, but access to safe, affordable, accessible, sustainable,
and stable housing.
Certainly, we could implement a coordinated set of programs that
would aid individuals — and particularly the disadvantaged — in
gaining access to safe, affordable, accessible, sustainable, and stable
housing. The tax system could play a role in achieving this goal,
especially as it relates to affordability. Among the reforms of existing
tax preferences and proposals for new tax preferences that one could
imagine being offered for consideration (either separately or in
combination) as a means of achieving this goal are:
1. Recognizing that one of the biggest hurdles to
homeownership is the inability to cover the up-front costs of
300

Mann, supra note 250, at 1384.
Ventry, supra note 189, at 275 (quoting Robert J. Wells, It’s Time to Revisit
the Interest Deduction Rules, 60 TAX NOTES 649, 652 (Aug. 2, 1993)).
302
Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329,
348 (2009) (indicating that the rate of homeownership among whites was 76% while
the rate of homeownership among Asian Americans was 61% and among African
Americans and Latino/as was below 50%); see also MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M.
SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL
INEQUALITY 109 tbl.5.4 (1995) (showing a twenty-two percentage point spread
between white and black homeownership rates; that is, an overall 63.8%
homeownership rate for whites and an overall 41.6% homeownership rate for blacks);
Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to Homeownership: Using Tax
Incentives to Encourage Homeownership Among Renters, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97,
101 fig.1 (2007) (charting homeownership rates among whites and blacks from 1994 to
2005).
303
The State of Transgender California Report: Results from the 2008 California
Transgender Economic Health Survey, TRANSGENDER LAW CTR. 7 (2009), http://
www.transgenderlawcenter.org/archives/860.
301
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304

homeownership (i.e., the down payment and closing costs),
we might consider reinstating some form of the first-time
homebuyer credit that expired in 2010 and/or instituting a
tax-deferred savings account for first-time homebuyers the
305
proceeds of which must be used to purchase a home.
2. Recognizing that not all individuals will (or even wish to)
become homeowners along with the existing discrimination in
306
favor of homeowners and against renters in our tax laws, we
might consider adopting a refundable renter’s credit based on
the models employed by some states (e.g., Minnesota’s
renter’s property tax refund program or New Jersey’s
property tax deduction/credit), which attempt to distribute
property tax relief more equitably to both homeowners and
307
renters.
3. Recognizing that the lower rates of minority
homeownership are due to a long and continuing history of
discriminatory housing-related practices (e.g., redlining and
308
reverse redlining), we might choose not to eliminate the
304

Mann, supra note 250, at 1367–68.
I.R.C. § 36; see Covington & Harrell, supra note 302, at 113–16 (proposing a
rather limited first-time homebuyer credit); Mann, supra note 250, at 1396 (suggesting
the possibility that a proposed shelter credit could be fashioned as a savings vehicle
for renters who wish to become homeowners).
306
For example, both homeowners and renters pay real property taxes
(homeowners directly and renters indirectly), but only homeowners are permitted to
deduct those taxes from their gross income for federal income tax purposes. I.R.C. §
164; Treas. Reg. § 1.164-1(a) (as amended in 1978) (“In general, taxes are deductible
only by the person upon whom they are imposed.”); Covington & Harrell, supra note
302, at 107.
307
MINN. STAT. § 290A.04 (2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:3A-18 (West 2012). For
a description of these programs, see Renter’s Property Tax Refund, MINN. REVENUE,
http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/individuals/prop_tax_refund/Pages/Renters_Property
_Tax_Refund.aspx (last updated August 16, 2012); NJ Income Tax–Property Tax
Deduction/Credit, N.J. DEP’T OF TREASURY, http://www.nj.gov/treasury/taxation/
njit35.shtml (last updated Dec. 12, 2011). But see Renters’ Credit Maintained in 2011,
Cut in 2012, MINN. BUDGET PROJECT (August 2011), http://www.
mnbudgetproject.org/research-analysis/minnesota-taxes/credits/011-renters-credit.pdf.
308
Hanson & Hanson, supra note 273, at 448–49 (“But the opportunity of home
ownership was illusory for minorities, due in part to the ‘statistically-justified’
discriminatory policies of lending agencies. Indeed, of the $120 billion in home loans
issued between 1932 and 1962, more than 98% went to white families. Redlining and
restrictive covenants reinforced neighborhood racial boundaries. Because blacks were
effectively barred from new suburban developments, even newly settled areas
305
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home mortgage interest deduction but instead to convert it
into a refundable credit (to make it available to all taxpayers,
including many lower- and middle-income taxpayers who do
309
not itemize) and limit its application to areas that have been
redlined or reverse redlined, while building limits into the
credit to provide safeguards against predatory lending
practices.
4. Recognizing the history of discrimination described
immediately above as well as the fact that homeowners in
areas with more than ten percent African American
homeownership experience market discrimination (i.e., a
310
drop in housing values once this tipping point is reached),
we might consider Dorothy Brown’s proposal for a timelimited refundable credit that would replace both the home
mortgage interest deduction and the deduction for property
taxes in areas with more than ten percent African American

reflected stark segregation.” (footnotes omitted)); see generally Charles L. Nier, III,
Perpetuation of Segregation: Toward a New Historical and Legal Interpretation of
Redlining Under the Fair Housing Act, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 617 (1999)
(describing the historical origins and continued practice of redlining); Barbara
Ehrenreich & Dedrick Muhammad, Op-Ed., The Recession’s Racial Divide, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2009, at WK17 (describing “reverse redlining” as “intensive
marketing aimed at black neighborhoods in the name of extending home ownership
to the historically excluded” and explaining its connection with the subprime
mortgage crisis); Andrew Martin, Judge Allows Redlining Suits to Proceed, N.Y.
TIMES, May 6, 2011, at B9 (describing rulings from two courts that permitted lawsuits
to proceed against Wells Fargo that accused the bank of “deliberately steer[ing]
African-American borrowers who qualified for prime mortgages into subprime loans”
and of “approv[ing] mortgage refinancing or home equity loans for African-American
borrowers even though it knew or should have known that the borrowers couldn’t
afford the payments”).
309
For taxable year 2009, the Internal Revenue Service estimated that only
32.5% of all tax returns elected to itemize deductions. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 2009, at 36 tbl.1.2 (2011). Tax returns
reflecting an adjusted gross income of $50,000 or more comprised only about onethird of all tax returns filed for 2009. Id. Nonetheless, of the returns electing to
itemize deductions, the Internal Revenue Service estimated that some 70% fell into
this group of returns. Id. Moreover, nearly 75% of the returns claiming the home
mortgage interest deduction came from this group. Id. at 82 tbl.2.1. In contrast, the
two-thirds of all returns that reflected an adjusted gross income of less than $50,000
only comprised about 30% of the returns electing to itemize deductions and just
slightly more than 25% of the returns claiming the home mortgage interest deduction.
Id. at 36 tbl.1.2, 82 tbl.2.1.
310
Brown, supra note 302, at 354–60.
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homeownership — a proposal that would both redress this
history of discrimination and encourage more racially diverse
311
neighborhoods.
5. Recognizing the importance of the sustainability of
development, we might consider Roberta Mann’s proposal to
replace the home mortgage interest deduction (and perhaps
extend that proposal to replacing the deduction for property
taxes as well) with a refundable shelter credit that would be
comprised of (i) a base amount tied to median home prices
and (ii) a “location efficiency premium” for homes located
close to public transportation, both of which would tend to
312
discourage urban sprawl.
Naturally, which of these (or other) proposals are ultimately
adopted would depend on the course of the initial public discussion
and the subsequent tailoring of any tax proposals both to meet the
chosen goals for our development and to coordinate with any nontax
proposals for meeting those goals. As a result, full elaboration of these
tax proposals is both premature and beyond the scope of this article.
It is worth underscoring that housing is only one area where the
313
tax system might play a role in advancing human development.
Other tax preferences might be reformed or created for the purpose
of advancing human development in other areas (e.g., a refundable
tax credit to ease the financial burden on those who take unpaid leave
under the Family and Medical Leave Act in order to care for a loved
314
one or new child). Moreover, once we recognize that our tax laws
mirror the society that created them, there is no reason to limit our
horizons to examining only those provisions that can be classified as
315
tax preferences. After all, the local culture can express itself both
311

Id. at 371–74.
Mann, supra note 250, at 1393–96.
313
Though a full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article, taking
a people-centered approach to tax reform might provide reason for abandoning the
artificial political constraint that seems to have accompanied talk of tax reform since
1986 — revenue neutrality. Shaviro, supra note 220, at 817–19. For instance, a focus
on sustainable development might require tax reform to raise additional revenue so
that development today does not come at the expense of the development of future
generations. See supra text accompanying notes 134–138.
314
29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2011).
315
Indeed, one of the peripheral benefits of adopting a people-centered approach
to tax reform is that we can completely bypass unproductive debates regarding the
line between structural and nonstructural tax provisions, which have proven to be the
312

INFANTI.FINAL.DOC

2012]

10/23/2012 6:03 PM

Tax Reform Discourse

267
316

through structural provisions and tax preferences and penalties. To
317
draw again upon an earlier example, the influence of culture on
structural provisions can be seen in the choice of the different-sex
married couple as a taxable unit (as well as in the occasional
expansion of that taxable unit to the boundaries of the so-called
318
traditional family through the inclusion of the couple’s children).
We can — and should — consider ways that the tax laws as a whole —
both the structural provisions and any putative departures from the
319
chosen baseline — can advance human development.
V. CONCLUSION
The need to focus on people as people, and not as numbers, is, as
Mahbub ul Haq and Amartya Sen have both noted, far from a new
idea. In a sense, it represents a return to seeing the world through the
innocent eyes of a child. Thus, in closing, I would like to end with a
quote from my favorite book to read to my daughter before she goes
to bed at night, Le Petit Prince (translation below):
Si je vous ai raconté ces détails sur l’astéroïde B 612 et si je
vous ai confié son numéro, c’est à cause des grandes personnes.
Les grandes personnes aiment les chiffres. Quand vous leur
parlez d’un nouvel ami, elles ne vous questionnent jamais sur
l’essentiel. Elles ne vous disent jamais: « Quel est le son de sa
voix? Quels sont les jeux qu’il préfère? Est-ce qu’il collectionne
les papillons? » Elle vous demandent: « Quel âge a-t-il?
Combien a-t-il de frères? Combien pèse-t-il? Combien gagne
son père? » Alors seulement elles croient le connaître. Si vous
dites aux grandes personnes: « J’ai vu une belle maison en
briques roses, avec des géraniums aux fenêtres et des colombes
sur le toit. . . » elles ne parviennent pas à s’imaginer cette
maison. Il faut leur dire: « J’ai vu une maison de cent mille
Achilles heel of tax expenditure analysis. See supra text accompanying note 224. No
group of tax provisions should be spared scrutiny because they are “structural” or
part of some “normative” tax baseline.
316
See Livingston, supra note 264, at 124 (“[T]ax culture may express itself
broadly, in the values and goals that the tax system tries to achieve, or more narrowly,
in the design of particular institutions and structures.”).
317
See supra text accompanying note 280.
318
See I.R.C. §§ 1(g), 6013.
319
Bittker, supra note 212, at 985 (“[T]he income tax structure cannot be
discovered, but must be constructed; it is the final result of a multitude of debatable
judgments.”).
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francs. » Alors elles s’écrient: « Comme c’est joli! »

320

ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPERY, LE PETIT PRINCE 19–20 (1946). Here is my own
translation: “If I have told you these details about asteroid B612 and if I have
confided in you its number, it’s because of the grown ups. Grown ups love numbers.
When you talk to them about a new friend, they never ask you about the important
things. They never ask you: ‘What does his voice sound like? What are his favorite
games? Does he collect butterflies?’ They ask you: ‘How old is he? How many
brothers does he have? How much does he weigh? How much does his father make?’
Only in that way do they think they know him. If you tell grown ups, ‘I saw a beautiful
pink brick house with geraniums in the windows and doves on the roof . . .’ they
cannot manage to picture that house. It’s necessary to tell them: ‘I saw a 100,000 franc
house.’ Then they will cry, ‘It’s so pretty!’”

